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ABSTRACT
The conventional wisdom concerning the future of Iraq
after the Gulf War of 1990-1991 centers on the prospect of
Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party being ousted from power.
Should this happen, critics argue, peace, security, and
predictability will return to Iraq in particular and the
Middle East in general. This view of the situation is
wrong.
This thesis examines the political history of Iraq since
the end of World War One, the formation of the Ba'th Party,
and the Ba'th Party since its ascent to power in Iraq.
Leadership, Institutionalization, Policies, and Legitimacy
form the core of the Ba'thist hold on power in Iraq. In its
25 years of power the Ba'th Party has improved the standard
of living in Iraq and penetrated society such that any
change of regime will result in only marginal and
superficial change. The resulting leadership may call
itself by other names, but the majority of people in
positions of power will be holdovers from the Ba'th regime.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The Persian Gulf War of 1990-1991 has raised serious
questions as to the desirability of the leadership in Iraq
of the Ba'th Party in general and Saddam Hussein in
particular. To most outside observers, the problem in Iraq
is Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party. They suggest that if
he and his party were eliminated that the problems with Iraq
would be ended. This line of thinking ignores what has
happened in Iraq since it became a nation and the events of
the last 25 years.
Iraq became a country in 1919 under a British mandate.
The British installed a king and created a constitutional
monarchy which would lead Iraq to independence in 1932. The
monarchy overcame several challenges to its rule and lasted
until 1958 when the army rebelled and the royal family was
killed. Iraq became a republic, and the next ten years
would see the reins of power shift four times. This was the
decade in which the Ba'th Party came to prominence and was
nearly eliminated at the hands of the Iraqi leadership. The
party survived and in July 1968 came to power after it first
seized the government and then eliminated its rivals.
In 1939 the party was born in Syria. It was started by
three nationalist schoolteachers upset with the mandate
vi
system in Syria. The movement grew and spread to Iraq in
1952. It was a small movement in Iraq, with only about 50
members in 1952. It was a highly disciplined and structured
organization. The ideology of "unity, freedom, socialism"
was, and still is, the guiding principle of the Ba'th Party.
The leadership of the party has been solid and ruthless
from the beginning. There have been four leaders of
consequence with the two most important being Ahmad Hasan
al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. It is under the direction of
these two men that the Ba'th Party came to power in 1968 and
has remained in power through the present day. The
leadership has been very disciplined and has used
propaganda, oppression, and the reliance on close tribal or
family relations to maintain its grip on power.
The party has also sought to institutionalize its rule
in every sector of society. Through the use of its highly
developed political organization the party has penetrated
virtually every bureaucratic, civil, and military
organization in Iraq. The party has grown from 50 members
in 1952 to over 50,000 in 1984 with well over 1.5 million
active supporters. The government and party payrolls have
grown to about 30 percent of the population of 18 million.
The party has implemented economic policies that have
raised the standard of living in Iraq. It nationalized the
oil industry in 1972 and proceeded to follow several
vii
industrialization and modernization programs designed to
make Iraq an economic power in the region. The successful
social programs started by the Ba'th Party have included
free education and healthcare as well as a determined effort
to re-educate the people on their "Iraqi" history.
The government has attempted to stifle opposition by
trying to improve the quality of life, but when that has not
worked, it has used force. Estimates as high as 500,000
people being deported or relocated are common. The regime
has been accused of brutality and of using chemical weapons
on its own civilian population.
The party has used the constitution, national elections,
cooperation or elimination opposition parties, and its
longevity to claim legitimacy. These efforts have made
large portions of society dependent on the Ba'th. In
effect, the Ba'th has created a constituency.
The United Nations has done a great deal of harm to the
Ba'thist government, but that government has survived. The
punishments and sanctions have been used as propaganda by
the Ba'th with some apparent success. The Western hope that
once Saddam Hussein leaves the scene, things will return to
normal is not well founded. The Ba'th Party may go away,
but the people in control will not. There are too many
people with too much to lose for that to happen. They will
call themselves something else, but they will be there.
viii
I. INTRODUCTION
At the end of World War One, the victorious powers
created the modern day state of Iraq. They installed a
king, ran a mandate, and granted independence to the state
in 1932. What followed was a revolution that overthrew the
monarchy in 1958, three military dictatorships over the
following ten years, and finally another revolution, or
coup, that secured the rule of the Arab Socialist Ba'th
Party (ASBP) that has lasted until the present day. From
the beginning of Ba'thist rule in Baghdad, there have been
two major wars and more or less continuous internal
dissention between the government and the Iraqi Kurdish and
Shi'a populations.
It is the last war which poses the greatest questions
about the future of Iraq. The 1990-1991 Gulf War saw the
Iraqi Army defeated and the country left in ruins. The
major problem according to outside observers was that Saddam
Hussein remained in power after Iraq's defeat. The
principle assumption appears to be that "peace, security,
and predictability will return to the Middle East once
-- .= -- -- ----- ,- m~m•nm i umnmm n1
Saddam Hussein is ousted"' and that "Iraq's travails would
have ended with Saddam's fall."2 These views are the
optimistic aspirations of the leaders of the world that was
aligned against Iraq during the war. However, they ignore
the facts on the ground in Iraq and the staying power of men
like Saddam Hussein. It is my thesis that the Ba'th Party
and Saddam Hussein as the primary defining leader, has
changed Iraq such that once Saddam Hussein is no longer in
power, the resulting leadership, whether Ba'thist or not,
will be very similar.
In addressing this question from the historical
perspective, there are certain aspects about Iraq that must
be examined. The first is the political history of Iraq
from the time it was declared a state after World War One
until the advent to power of the Ba'th Party under the
leadership of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein. The
second aspect is the Ba'th Party up until 1968 itself, to
include: the birth, growth, structure, ideology, and
leadership of the party. The third, and most important,
'Christine M. Helms, "Political Environment in Iraq:
Prospects for Change," in Balance of Power in Central and
Southwest Asia, ed. Steven R. Dorr and Neysa M. Slater
(Washington D.C.: Defense Academic Research Support Program,
1992), 39.
2Graham E. Fuller, Iraa in the Next Decade: Will Iraq
Survive Until 2002? RAND Note N-3591-DAG (Santa Monica: RAND,
1993), 1.
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aspect to be considered will be the Ba'th Party in Iraq
after 1968, including: the leadership, the
institutionalization, the policies, and the legitimacy that
the Ba'th has generated during its tenure. Finally, in the
conclusion, consideration will be given to the Gulf War of
1990-1991 and its aftermath as well as to the future of
Iraq.
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II. POLITICAL HISTORY SINCE THE MANDATE
The political history of Iraq since the mandate can be
divided into four distinct periods. They are: Colonial
(1919-1932), Monarchical (1932-1958), Autocratic (1958-
1968), and Totalitarian (1968-the present). For the
purposes of this chapter the examination will be inclusive
through the Autocratic period. The post 1968 period will be
addressed in a later chapter.
A. COLONIAL PERIOD: (1919-1932)
Prior to World War One the area now known as Iraq was
part of the Ottoman Empire. While it is clear that Britain
was firmly in control of Iraq by the end of the war it was
not until the end that their rule became official. The
British victory and the 1919 Paris Peace Conference ensured
that "Iraq was formally made a class A mandate entrusted to
Britain. "3
The British initially followed a policy that was
primarily "one that would establish an Arab government
3Iraa: A Country Study, 4th ed., Area Handbook Series, ed.
Helen Chaplin Metz, (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1990), 32. The Iraqi
mandate was completed at the April 1920 San Remo Conference in
Italy when Palestine was also given to Britain and Syria was
given to France.
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capable of protecting Britain's interests." 4 In
implementing this policy the British used British military
and foreign service officers to either run or advise the
government at every level.' It was apparent that efficient
government was wanted before any arabization could take
place. This policy, the 1920 San Remo Conference, and what
Antonius describes as the "denial of independence and the
arbitrary imposition of the mandatory system," 6 led to the
decisive event during the colonial period: the 1920 revolt.
The revolt started shortly after the completion of the
conference and by July had spread to Mosul and throughout
the Euphrates River Valley. 7 For three months, June, July,
and August, there was widespread unrest in oppcsition to
British rule. The revolt was eventually put down, but the
cost to the British was exceptionally high, with over 40
4Phebe Marr, The Modern History of Iraq (Boulder: Westview
Press, 1985), 29.
5Ibid., 32. Marr lists 1,022 British officers, many from
India, in 1920 as administrators. This was further compounded by
Indians staffing the subordinate positions within the
administration. (Iraq: A Country Study, 33).
6George Antonius, The Arab Awakening (Lebanon: Librairie Du
Liban, 1969), 313.
'Iraq: A Country Study, 34.
5
million pounds sterling spent and more than 400 British
soldiers killed.'
In response to the revolt, the British had Sir Percy Cox
take over duties as Civil Commissioner, replacing the more
heavy handed Colonel Arnold Talbot Wilson. 9 Additionally,
Britain held a conference in Cairo in March of 1921 which
gave Cox a new set of instructions with regard to the
mandate. The new goal was to end the military government,
formulate an Iraqi constitution, and arabize the government
with Arab leadership."° The decision was made to create a
monarchy which would be favorable to the British. King
Faisal of the Hashimite clan, who was in exile in Palestine,
was chosen to be king. While there was a vote in which
Faisal received 96 percent approval, Marr suggests that "his
real support was nowhere near that figure."11
On 27 August 1921, Faisal was coronated. With him came
the arabization of the government and the new focus on
independence for Iraq. In 1922 Iraq signed the first of
OMarr, 33. Antonius says Arab deaths were about 4,000 and
total casualties were around 10,000 (The Arab AwakeninQ, 314).
9Antonius, 314,315. Wilson was actually Cox's deputy but was
acting as Civil Commissioner while Cox was serving in Persia
between April 1918 and October 1920.
I'Marr, 33.
"Ibid., 36. She goes further to say that Faisal's
competition was removed by the British prior to the election.
6
four treaties of alliance with the British."2 These
treaties gave the British a relatively free hand in the
administration of Iraq. British advisors retained control
of almost all foreign, fiscal, and domestic issues.
Although the army was under the control of the Iraqi
government, with British advisors, the British were able to
maintain a separate force to ensure their position within
the country."3
The decade of British control was characterized by the
drive for modernization, arabization of the administration,
and for the birth of nationalist movements within the
country.1 4 It was not until June 1929 that Britain decided
to support the longstanding request by Iraq for membership
in the League of Nations. The resulting Anglo-Iraqi treaty
negotiations were tedious and filled with setbacks. They
were finally completed in June 1930 after a new Iraqi prime
minister, Nuri al-Sa'id, was brought in to replace Abd al-
Muhsin al-Sa'dun, who had committed suicide in November
1929.1'
"
2Antonius, 360. The others were in 1926, 1927, and 1930.
"
3Marr, 39. They relied on the RAF and an Assyrian force
numbering about 5,000 which was under British control.
"I4 bid., 29. It should be remembered that nationalist
movements were widespread throughout the Middle East as well as
Europe during the interwar years.
15Irag: A Country Study, 39.
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The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 had both good and bad
points for Iraq. The British agreed to support the
nomination of Iraq into the League of Nations in 1932 and
they were to officially end the mandate. But the costs of
British support would be high. The British retained their
rights to bases, wartime occupation, exclusive British
advisory help, and the appointment of a British Ambassador
that would "take precedence over other ambassadors.""' The
British essentially remained in the same position as before
the treaty but with greatly reduced costs. With the
strongly pro-British monarchy and government in control,
Iraq was admitted into the League of Nations in October 1932
as an independent state, the first mandate state to do so.
Once Iraq became officially independent it entered into a
new era in its history.
B. MONARCHICAL PERIOD: (1932-1958)
King Faisal I, the third son of King Husain, the Sherif
of Mecca, was to be the first of three Hashimite Kings in
Iraq. His reign in an independent Iraq was short as he died
on 7 September 1933 of a heart attack while visiting
Switzerland. His son Ghazi, who was 21 years old, became
King. During this period the government in Iraq went
through crises in nationalist sentiments, coup d' "etat's,
16Marr, 51.
8
the Second World War, the Palestinian War of 1948, and the
emergence of the communist's as a political force, as well
as conducting the business of governing, which had been
carried out by the British during the mandate.
The nationalist sentiment was rising towards the end of
the mandate and it continued to grow throughout the period
of the monarchy. King Ghazi was even considered an "ardent
but inexperienced Arab nationalist.""7 He was much less
amenable to British suggestions than his father had been.
But this nationalism was also extracting a toll on Iraq. The
thirties were years of civil and political unrest, from 1933
through 1939 Iraq had eight different governments." 8
The tribal revolts of 1934 and 1935-1936 were just the
beginning of the governments problems. The world was in
depression and nationalism was on the rise in many
countries, and Iraq was no exception. The anti-British
feelings were being fanned by the Palestine situation, the
continuing British presence in Iraq, and the effective
nationalist propaganda of the German minister in Baghdad,
Fritz Grobba. The movement was centered around schools
where the limited number of teachers had large audiences. 1 9




It was these feelings that gave impetus to the 1936 Bakr
Sidqi coup, the first military coup to take place in the
modern Middle East.
The reasons given for the coup range from nationalist
motivations to reaction to the oppressive actions of the
government and go as far as the desire to emulate the
successful authoritarian governments of Europe. 20 The real
significance of the coup was the fact that it was carried
out by the military. It signaled the rise of military
dominance in the political arena. They installed an "Iraqi
First" government that alienated the Arab nationalists and
that would last until General Sidqi was assassinated in
1937.21 For a time the pro-British forces in the government
reasserted themselves with the formation of the Nuri al-
Sa'id government in December 1938.
The re-emergence of Nuri was followed closely by the
untimely death of Ghazi in 1939. This allowed the
appointment of a regent due to the fact that Ghazi's son,
Faisal II, born May 1935, was still a small child. The
regent, Abd al-Ilah was the Queen's brother and the son of
King Ali, the last King of the Hejaz, and was considered
pro-British and "controllable" by Nuri. The other factor in
20Ibid., 68, 69. Germany and Italy are the examples cited.
21Ibid., 73, 75.
10
Iraqi politics at this time was the imminence of World War
Two. While the Arab nationalist's were in favor of
supporting the Germans, the Nuri government broke relations
with Germany in late 1939. Arab nationalist sentiments won
out because in 1940 Nuri ended up resigning, and was
replaced by the strongly pro-German government of Rashid
Ali.
The regent and Nuri continued to press pro-British
positions and eventually had to flee Baghdad in April 1941
when Rashid Ali, with the backing of the army, took control
of the country. This action was as far as the nationalist's
were able to get prior to the revolution of 1958 and it was
to be short lived. No sooner had Nuri and the Regent left
when the British invaded and reoccupied Iraq. The coup was
in April and by June they were fully in control of Baghdad.
By 1942 there were six brigades of soldiers and two armored
brigades from Britain, India, and Poland in the country. 22
The King, his regent, and Nuri were also back in power and
ever more reliant on the British for their position in Iraq.
The war years saw Iraq struggle economically as most
underdeveloped countries did, but it also saw the
reinstalled Iraqi government bow to British pressure and
declare war on Germany as the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930
22Ibid., 85,87.
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stipulated. By the end of the war (1945), Iraq had joined
the new Arab League and United Nations. 23
After World War Two the regent embarked on what might be
called a liberalization plan to allow political parties.
There were five licensed, of which four were in opposition,
and one unlicensed, the Communist, which was the most
influential. 2 ' However, the liberalization did not last
because of 1946 incidents such as the civil unrest in Kirkut
and Abadan. The regent, with help from Nuri, clamped down
on political freedoms to retain control of the country. The
regent had also attempted to gain concessions, and increase
his position domestically, from the British in the form of
the Portsmouth Treaty of 1947, but the resistance to it was
so severe that the government was forced to resign and the
plan was eventually repudiated. Following this politically
stressful year was to come another, and possibly more
catastrophic year.
In May of 1948, war broke out in Palestine. Not only
did the Arab armies, with Iraqi participation, lose the war,
but Iraq lost half of its oil revenue and most of the Iraqi
Jewish community immigrated to Israel. 25 The decade ended
23Irag: A Country Study, 46.
24Marr, 98. She lists them by name and provides an outline
of their platforms.
25Irag: A Country Study, 48.
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with Iraq licking its wounds and rerouting oil pipelines in
order to recoup oil revenue. By 1952 the economy was on the
rebound, new oil royalty agreements with the Iraqi Petroleum
Company (IPC), and the governments programs for improving
social and economic conditions were beginning to bear
fruit.26
The 1950s, however, would be the defining decade for
Iraq. During the decade the government continued to repress
political dissent and used force when necessary to keep
order. Faisal II became King on his 18th birthday in 1953
and the regent, who had been in charge, became crown prince,
as long as Faisal II had no male children.27 It was during
this time that pan-Arab nationalism was gripping Egypt and
Syria. There was great pressure for Iraq to make some move
on the international scene and it was in this area that Iraq
would make crucial mistakes.
First, in 1954 the Cold War finally hit home in Iraq.
The Nuri government broke relations with the Soviet Union
and embarked on the Western sponsored Northern Tier program
of containment. By the end of 1955 Iraq was a principal




member of the Baghdad Pact. 2 8 This new internationalism was
opposed by virtually all Arab nationalists, both inside Iraq
and throughout the Middle East. British participation in an
otherwise regional organization was viewed as a threat to
the sovereignty of Iraq and a rekindling of colonialism in
the Middle East. As George Lenczowski put it in his book,
The Middle East in World Affairs:
Following Iraq's adherence to the Baghdad Pact in 1955,
its policies could be described as a forging of links with
the West, isolation from the Arab world, and concentration
on its own economic development. 29
The isolation from the Arab world was the important
aspect of Iraq's participation in the Baghdad Pact. Shortly
after signing the Pact, the Suez crisis in Egypt erupted.
Opposition to government policies was stronger than ever
after the British invaded Egypt in 1956, so much so that
Nuri declared martial law. 3" The new round of oppressive
tactics eventually forced Nuri to leave office and go back
to parliament.
Second, in response to the union between Egypt and
Syria, the formation of the UAR, the government felt that it
2 8George Lenczowski, The Middle East in World Affairs
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1980), 283-286. The members of





°Marr, 119. Martial law was in place until May of 1957.
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needed to form a counter to it. The logical choice seemed
to be a Federation with Jordan, the other Hashimite monarchy
in the Middle East. Iraq was to be the senior partner, with
Nuri becoming Prime Minister of the Federation. What the
Federation succeeded in accomplishing was to further isolate
Iraq from the rest of the Arab countries. The Federation
also had the effect of increasing internal opposition to the
monarchy due to the reliance on Iraqi revenue to fund over
80 percent of the Federation due to the fiscal limitations
of Jordan.
The final, and fatal, error made by the government came
in 1958. Civil War had broken out in Lebanon and the Iraqi
government decided to send forces to intervene. This action
gave the opposition the opportunity it needed to move on the
government. In July 1958, the forces assigned to go to
Lebanon under the command of Colonel Abd al-Salam Aref, one
of the principle Free Officers, instead went to Baghdad and
carried out the revolution that would end the monarchy. 3'
As Marr suggests, the final years of the monarchy were
concerned with foreign affairs, such as the Baghdad Pact,
the Suez crisis, and the Federation with Jordan, while
becoming ever more authoritarian and oppressive at home.
3
'Hanna Batatu, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary
Movements in Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978),
800.
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She goes further to say, "the seeds of future military
dictatorship were sown by Nuri's authoritarian regime
between 1954 and 1958."'2 She was right.
C. AUTOCRACY PERIOD: (1958-1968)
The King and Crown Prince were killed on 14 July 1958
and Nuri al-Sa'id was killed a day later in Baghdad. The
revolution of the group of Free Officers was now complete.
The revolution had ushered in a decade of rule that would be
characterized by the resurgence of military leadership and
the rise, fall, and rise again of the Ba'th Party.
The principal leader of the Free Officers was Brigadier
Abd al-Karim Qasim, who became the new ruler of Iraq. 33 He
quickly moved to abolish the Parliament and consolidate
power in the hands of the Free Officers. 3" Initially the
revolution was thought to be a great victory for the Arab
nationalist cause, but with time it became clear that Qasim
was not interested in the cause. A power struggle developed
between Qasim and Aref over the future policies of the
country. Aref was an Arab nationalist while Qasim, being of
32Marr, 124, 125.
33Batatu, 800. Batatu gives a detailed listing of the
membership and the positions each would eventually have.
3
'Marr, 155. The Free Officers had clear plans on how to
take power but were ambiguous about what they would do once in
power. Marr lists 12 general ideas of the Free Officer's
program.
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Kurdish origin, was more of an Iraqi nationalist. More
importantly, Qasim was concerned with his own position and
retaining power. This conflict led Qasim to have Aref
arrested and sent to prison in early 1959 on a charge of
treason," thus temporarily eliminating his principle
political rival. Qasim had also disposed of Rashid Ali, 36
who had returned after 17 years in exile, by accusing him of
plotting a coup, which prompted pan-Arab members of Qasim's
cabinet to resign.
Throughout 1959, and somewhat throughout his entire
tenure, Qasim relied on the communists to retain power. It
was primarily the communists that he relied on to keep the
pan-Arabist groups in check. The communists pressured Qasim
into pulling out of the Baghdad Pact and increasing military
and economic ties to the Soviet Union in early 1959. Events
in March and July would drive a wedge between Qasim and the
communists.
In March 1959 a group of disgruntled Free Officers in
Mosul were massacred by communist supporters of Qasim.37
Although Qasim had engineered the presence of the
35Ibid., 160. Aref's death sentence was commuted to life and
he was pardoned in December 1962 and would become the President
after the Bathist coup of 1963.
36Ibid., 162.
37Iraq: A Country Study, 51.
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communists, the resulting power that the communists assumed
would spring up again in July. The incidents at the Kirkut
communist rallies would push Qasim away from the Communist
Party. These events also moved other pan-Arab groups,
namely the Ba'th, to decide that Qasim had to go.
The Ba'th attempted to assassinate Qasim in October 1959
but were unsuccessful. This was to be a sign of the future
for Qasim. He attempted to bring political action under his
control with a law concerning political parties in 1960 but
eventually gave up on it in 1962 after it proved
ineffective. 38 Qasim had become a one man show. He took on
foreign policy himself, by repudiating the 1937 Shatt al-
Arab agreement with Iran, by precipitating the Kuwait crisis
in 1961, and by breaking off relations with the other states
in the Middle East in response to their support of Kuwait
during the Kuwait crisis.39
Qasim, like the monarchy he overthrew, had become
isolated. Although the Soviet Union strove to support him
through the Iraqi Communist Party to the end and even tried
to warn him of the impending dangers, 40 it was the isolated
Qasim that was ousted by a Ba'thist coup in February 1963.
38Marr, 167.




This government would last for only ten months in which
the party would strive to physically eliminate its rivals by
whatever means possible. The principle means for this was
their paramilitary force, the National Guard, which numbered
around 5,000 in February 1963 and 34,000 in August 1963.41
The brutality of the Ba'th during 1963 caused its downfall
and rise of Abd al-Salam Aref, who had been something of a
figurehead President, as the undisputed leader of Iraq.
While Aref was a pan-Arabist and he initially put
several pan-Arabists in his cabinet, his desire for joining
the United Arab Republic waned after he gained power.
Eventually he would rid his government of the pan-Arabists
in 1965 and replace them with members of his tribal group.
It was Aref that introduced socialist programs into Iraq
with the nationalization of many companies. He would govern
until killed in a helicopter crash in April 1966.42 Aref's
successor was named a week later, it was his brother, Abd
al-Rahman Aref.
He was elected president by the National Defense Council
and Cabinet on 17 April 1966 with the backing of the army." 3
The idea was apparently that he could be manipulated by
"4'Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, Irag Since 1958
(London: I.B. Taurus and Co., 1990), 85.
42Iraq:A Country Study, 55.
"
3Marr, 197. He was a colonel in the army himself.
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others. Adb al-Rahman Aref's regime can be characterized by
the following statement:
In the opinion of Phebe Marr, a leading authority on Iraq,
on the eve of the June 1967 War between Israel and various
Arab states, the Arif government had become little more
than a collection of army officers balancing the special
interests of various economic, political, ethnic, and
sectarian groups."
The failure of Aref to be a decisive leader was
compounded by the continuing Kurdish problem and the non-
participation of Iraqi troops in the 1967 war. He attempted
to regain his political power through oppressive measures,
but only succeeded in further inciting opposition groups.
It was in response to the failures of the second Aref regime
that the Ba'th was able to form an alliance with the army
and overthrow the regime on 17 July 1968. It is the Ba'th
regime that is in control today and the rest of this study
will focus on that.
"44Irag: A Country Study, 57.
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III. THE BA'TH PARTY TO 1968
In 1939 the beginnings of a political movement that
would have a far reaching impact in the late 20th century
were taking place in Syria. In response to the French
consenting to give up Alexandretta to Turkey, a Syrian
schoolteacher named Zaki al-Arsuri formed a group of ardent
nationalists to protest the decision. 45 At about the same
time Michel Aflaq and Salah al-Din al-Bitar, also
schoolteachers, were beginning to form their own group in
Damascus, to be named the Arab Ba'th party in September of
1940.46 The merger of these two small groups formed the
nucleus of the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (ASBP) 7 , or Ba'th
Party.
From these humble beginnings would emerge a powerful
political party which would eventually rely on the use of
civilian leadership instead of the traditional military
4 5Batatu, 722.
"41Ibid., 726.
47Ibid., 729,730. The Ba'th merged with Akram al-Hurani's
Arab Socialist Party in November 1952 and the name of the
combined party was changed to the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party. In
other works the name of the party is the Arab Ba'th Socialist
Party (Republic of Fear, al-Khalil).
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leadership that had been relied on to that point.4" The
work of three men would shape the destiny of Iraq for the
foreseeable future. The Ba'th would eventually actively
participate in the 1958 revolution, overthrow the resulting
military government, and finally, after being ousted from
power themselves, return five years later to create the
present government of Iraq.
In this chapter the introduction to the origins of the
Ba'th Party in Syria, its spread to Iraq, and the structure
that it took on will be addressed first. Second will come
the examination of the party ideology as defined by the
founders and the changes that were made in response to the
rifts within the party. Finally the Ba'th Party leadership
in Iraq during the three principle periods prior to 1968
will be examined.
A. FORMATION AND STRUCTURE OF THE PARTY
The Ba'th got its start in Syria sometime in the early
1940's and branched out to Iraq, as well as several other
"
48Khaldoun Hasan al-Nageeb, "Social Origins of the
Authoritran State in the Arab East," in Statecraft in the
Middle Eas, ed. Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides (Miami:
Florida International University Press, 1991) 53. He points out
that in the 15 years following the 1948 Palestine War there were
military coups in over two-thirds of the countries in the Middle
East. Between 1960 and 1970 he notes 38 such coups (20
succeeding and 18 failures). In Iraq the leadership was military
with al-Bakr but it has been primarily Saddam Hussein who has
been making decisions since the early years of the Ba'th regime.
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countries, about a decade later. In Iraq Since 1958, the
authors suggest that the formation of the party was
developed partly as a national liberation movement in
opposition to the French and partly in response to what
its leaders regarded as the political and ideological
inadequacies of the older generation of Syrian
nationalists."'
In this section an examination of the formation of the
Ba'th first in Syria and then Iraq will be made, with an
outline of the party structure to follow.
1. Formation in Syria
Batatu pinpoints the origins of the Ba'th Party to
September 1940.50 The principle founders, Michel Aflaq and
Salah al-Din Bitar, were both Sorbonne educated
schoolteachers in Damascus who had formed a nationalist
group in opposition to the mandate. The third founder was
Zaki al-Arsuzi, also a Sorbonne educated schoolteacher in
Alexandretta5 l who had formed a group in opposition to the
French and their policy that gave the district of
Alexandretta to Turkey. The two groups merged to form what
is commonly referred to as the Arab Ba'th Party.5 2
"
4Sluglett and Sluglett, 87.
50Batatu, 726.
5 Amatzia Baram Culture, History and Ideology in the
Formation of Ba'thist Iraq, 1968-89 (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1991), 9. Arsuzi never actually joined the Ba'th Party.
1 2S.N. Mehdi, "Ba'athist Syria and Iraq: A Comparative
Approach," Islamic Revolution, 3, no. 11 (1981): 5.
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The initial converts were students from the colleges
and secondary schools of Syria. By 1942 both Aflaq and
Bitar had left their jobs as teachers to devote more time to
the organization of the party. Their following was quite
small for the first few years and they did not declare
themselves publicly until June of 1946."~ The Party
Newspaper, Al-Ba'th, was issued for the first time on 3 July
1946. The Party finally adopted a Constitution at the first
Party Congress in April 1947.
The Party Congress of 1947 was the defining event
for the early Ba'th. It is here that the rules for
membership were drawn up as well as the organization was
defined. At this point the Ba'th was being run by Aflaq and
the rules such that he would have the final say on all party
issues."4 The Constitution that was adopted during the
Congress had three fundamental principles: "Unity and
Freedom of the Arab Nation, Personality of the Arab Nation,
and The Mission of the Arab Nation. ,5 5 The Ba'th had
5
'Batatu, 727. The party membership was under 10 in 1943
and it would only number 4500 by 1952.
54 Ibid., 744.
"John F. Devlin The Ba'th Party: A History from its Origins
to 1966 (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1976), 346, 347.
Appendix D of his book contains the 1947 Constitution of the
Ba'th Party.
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declared themselves to be a pan-Arab organization and
dedicated to striving for the people.
The Balth continued to build membership and spread
its message throughout Syria and to other Middle Eastern
countries. The Palestine War of 1948 gave a new boost to
nationalist causes as the Arab people witnessed the failures
of the ruling governments. However, the Ba'th continued to
remain a small group as the Party suffered a setback in 1949
when the government published a letter written by Aflaq,
while in jail, renouncing political ambitions.56 It was not
until the 1952 merger with the Arab Socialist Party,
founded by Akram al-Hurani in Hama, that the Ba'th Party
began to flourish. The merger of these two groups gave the
Ba'th a new name, the Arab Socialist Ba'th Party (ASBP), and
merging greatly increased the membership with the addition
of the Arab Socialist Party's 10,000 active members and
40,000 followers."
The post-Palestine War era is also the important
period for the formation of the Ba'th in other countries
around the Middle East. Up to the war, the Ba'th had been
confined to the areas surrounding Damascus and its





spread to Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan. The most important for
the spread was without a doubt, Iraq.
2. Formation in Iraq
The first signs of Ba'thism were brought to Iraq as
early as 1949 by a few Syrian teachers and by Iraqi students
returning from Syria and Lebanon." 8 Growth was slow in Iraq
as well as Syria during this time. The group was officially
recognized as a branch of the Ba'th in 1952.'9 An Arab
Shi'a, Fu'ad al-Rikabi, and Ba'th member since 1950 assumed
the leadership of the Iraqi Ba'th in 1951 and headed the
party for the next eight years. His stature was greatly
increased when he was elected to the National Command in
1954. Under his leadership the party went from about 50
members in 1951, 289 in 1955,60 and 300 members plus 1,200
"organized helpers", 2,000 "organized supporters", and
10,000 "unorganized supporters" in 1958.61
The initial organization was made up of
predominately lower income groups in Iraq, while the Syrian
organization came from the middle class. Batatu accounts
for this by pointing out that the middle class was much
"Majid Khadduri, Socialist IraQ: A Study in Iraci Politics




6 1Sluglett and Sluglett, 90.
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broader in other Middle Eastern countries than it was in
Iraq. Its geographical center was in Baghdad with the
province of Nasiriyyah as the second leading center for
recruits.62
The Iraqi Ba'th entered the political scene in 1955
with the organization of opposition to the Baghdad Pact 63
but came into its own after the 1958 Revolution. Rikabi
became Minister of Development in the Qasim cabinet, thus
representing the Ba'th in the new government. This
participation was short lived as the subject of unification
with the United Arab Republic was put forward and
immediately rejected by Qasim and Rikabi resigned.
Participation for the Ba'th would now become opposition.
The Ba'th actively sought to get rid of Qasim by any
means possible. The most notable event was the October 1959
assassination attempt by a group of Ba'thists, including
Saddam Hussein, that almost succeeded. But, by not
succeeding, the Ba'th brought the wrath of the Qasim
government down on it. The government started arresting
Ba'th members and by 26 December 1959, 77 members of the
party were on trial, 21 in absentia, for the failed
62Batatu, 743, 748. Batatu gives a complete breakdown of
locations, jobs, and religions of the membership as of 1955.
63Devlin, 107. They distributed handbills and incited
strikes. The government in turn arrested 22 and seized the Ba'th
Party mimeograph machines.
27
assassination attempt." This represented almost one-third
of the entire Iraqi Ba'th and the entire regional
leadership. It effectively halted the Iraqi Ba'thist
movement. Rikabi was discredited and on 29 November 1959
the Regional Command Council dissolved itself."
On 29 November 1959 the Iraqi Ba'th effectively
started over. The National Command in Syria set up a
Provisional Regional Command with Talib Shabib as Secretary
and including Ali Salih al-Sadi.66 The reconstitution of
the party was primarily left to al-Saldi when he returned to
Iraq in 1960. His presence in Iraq, while Shabib was in
Syria, allowed him to dominate the Iraqi Ba'th and in 1962
he was made Regional Secretary in place of Shabib. His
efforts at reconstruction were also successful with the
recruitment of some 1,000 probationary members in 1962" and
about 830 active members and 15,000 supporters in February
1963." From this rebirth the Balth was able to maintain
its membership and weather the turbulent period that would





6'Samir al-Khalil, Republic of Fear (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1989), 228.
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3. Structure of the Ba'th
The structure of the Ba'th Party"9 was defined at
the First Party Congress in April 1947 and then it was
modified in 1954 at the Second National Congress in June
1954. They provided the rules of party membership and
allowed the leadership to focus the party in the direction
they wanted to take it.
The 1947 meeting approved the Constitution of the
Ba'th Party and set the initial structure of the
organization. The structure was based on a five level
hierarchy with the Division (firqah), at least 12 men, being
the base unit, the Section (Shu'bah), two or more Divisions,
the Branch 'far'), two or more Sections, the Command Staff
(hay'at al-qiyadah), the heads of the party's
administrative, cultural, labor, athletics, and finance
bureau, and finally the Doyen (Amid), the party leader. In
addition to this basic structure, the membership was divided
into two levels, "members" and "principal members" of which
the "principal member" was the more important. The Doyen
was the "highest authority" and made all appointments to key
posts and he alone had to give the approval for a "member"
to become a "principal member" within the party. The Doyen
"
9Batatu, 744, 745. My primary source for this section is
Batatu but it can also be found in works by Marr and Devlin.
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was also the only elected member of the National Command, he
was elected for a period of two years.
The Second Pprty Congress was held in Damascus in
June of 1954. The party had grown and was expanding rapidly
to other countries throughout the Middle East. The merger
with the Arab Socialist Party had roughly tripled the
strength of the organization and it was necessary to revamp
the hierarchy and overall structure of the party to allow
for the increased membership. The new hierarchy was based
on seven levels instead of the original five.
The original hierarchy was adapted with the addition
of two new levels of party structure. The first was a new
base unit, the Cell (halagah), which allowed three to seven
men to organize instead of the original 12 or more. The
second was the addition of a new level just above the Branch
level. It was the Region (qutr) level, which allowed for
the absorption of countries other than Syria into the party
structure. Thus Iraq was now a region with its own Regional
Command and party hierarchy while still being tied to the
National Command. All other levels of party hierarchy
remained the same with the exception of the Doyen. The
Doyen position was renamed Secretary General and lost some
of its earlier power.
Other changes that were made were to make the party
more elective in nature and to take away much of the
30
appointment power of the leadership. Elections were to be
held at virtually every level of the party. The other main
change was the reclassification of members. The old
"member" and "principal member" categories were replaced
with "candidate" and "active member" categories. Under the
new system a "candidate" would become an "active member"
after a six month probationary period unless something
adverse was found to disqualify the candidate.
The party structure in Iraq was slightly different,
It consisted of the party wide hierarchy plus two additional
membership levels. The "organized partisan" and "organized
supporter" levels were introduced into Iraq in 1962 by the
Regional Command in order to regulate the flow of new
members into the Iraqi region of the party. 7"
B. IDEOLOGY OF THE PARTY
While it is true that the Ba'th Party was founded by
Arsuzi, Bitar, and Aflaq, there has only been one ideologue
for the party; Michel Aflaq. A Christian, both born and
raised in Damascus, Aflaq was a teenager during the
rebellious 1920's in Syria. Nationalism was on the rise and
he was exposed to it on a regular basis. Aflaq attended
Christian schools in his youth and then attended the




his greatest exposure to socialism through the "Marxist wave
that swept over the European campuses during the world-wide
slump and financial crisis of 1929-1932.""'
From this background Aflaq was to formulate the ideology
of the Ba'th. In this section an examination of Ba'thist
ideology as presented by Aflaq and some of the ideological
changes that have occurred through the breakup of the Syrian
and Iraqi Ba'th will be made.
1. Unity, Freedom, and Socialism
"Unity, Freedom, Socialism"- These words are the
defining ideological terms for the Ba'th party as envisioned
by Michel Aflaq. They are used in his literary works, party
propaganda, and, perhaps most significantly, in the Ba'th
Constitution. The early rhetoric of the party emphasized
the "re-creation of the Arab nation" in order to link itself
to the "Golden Age" of the first two "Arabro-Islamic"
empires, the Umayyad (661-750) and the Abbassid (750-
1258),72 and it was through the platform of "Unity, Freedom,
and Socialism" that Aflaq strove to achieve it.
The idea of "unity", or pan-Arabism, was not new to
the Middle East when Aflaq started preaching it, but the
71Batatu, 725.
72Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides, "Statecraft,Historical
Memory, and Popular Culture in Iraq and Kuwait," in Statecraft in
the Middle East, ed. Eric Davis and Nicolas Gavrielides (Miami:
Florida International University Press, 1991), 125.
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Ba'th made pan-Arabism their priority. Aflaq believed that
"Arab society could only be revitalized through Arab unity
(and) the Ba'th Party was to be the standard bearer and
vanguard of the Arab nation." 73 Through unity, Aflaq
argued, the artificial states and differences imposed upon
the Middle East by the colonial West would disappear. Unity
of the Arabs is also "historically inevitable" and a "moral
necessity" according to Aflaq. 74
The Ba'th Constitution of 1947 has a clear "unity"
message. Several articles deal with the subject of the
"Arab nation," the "Arab individual," and the "Arab
homeland." 7' The constitution clearly defines unified
borders of the "Arab fatherland" in Article seven, which
states:
The Arab fatherland is that part of the globe
inhabited by the Arab nation which stretches from the
Taurus Mountain, the Pocht-i-Kouh Mountains, the gulf of
Basra, the Arab Ocean, the Ethiopian Mountains, the
Sahara, the Atlantic Ocean,and the Mediterranean. 76
Aflaq also pushed the idea of unity further by
invoking religion in his cause. The Ba'th, being a secular
73Sluglett and Sluglett, 88.
7
'Batatu, 731.
7 Devlin, 345-352. The three "fundamental Principles",




party, had to develop a way to attract followers across
confessional lines, and religion was the means they chose to
do it. Great emphasis was given to the great Arab-Islamic
empires of the past. Rhetoric such as, "the force of Islam
... discloses itself in a new form, that of Arab
nationalism" and "Islam, in its pure essence, arose out of
the heart of Arabism" was used to attract a wider audience
to the cause. 77 The Ba'th used religion to legitimize their
appeal and to give people something to identify their
"Arabness" to.78
The pan-Arab "unity" principle of the Ba'th party
was followed by the second principle; Freedom. The
Ba'thist desire for "freedom" is for freedom of self-
determination. The very first principle of the 1947
Constitution states that the nation must be "free to direct
its own destiny."'7 9 To Aflaq, the colonial past of the
Middle East had to be addressed. Freedom from imperialism
was a key factor in building a nation.
It is important to consider, however, that Aflaq's
concept of "freedom" is for the Arab nation first and





freedom of individuals. The constitution proclaims rights
of individuals but is clear in limiting these rights "within
the limits of the higher Arab national interest." 80 Aflaq
calls the individual "the Foundation" of the nation. But he
also states that the individual must fulfill the required
"conditions" for being a part of that nation and it is the
Ba'ýh which imposes the conditions. 81
The third principle of the Ba'th is "socialism."
The constitution proclaims the "Party of the Arab Ba'th is a
socialist party." 82 Batatu suggests that while Aflaq was
influenced by the Communists, he strove to make the
socialism of the Ba'th clearly "Arab" in nature. By
claiming that "'socialism' like the other objectives of the
Ba'th, issues from the 'depths' of the Arab nation" 83, Aflaq
ties it to the greater goal of Arab unity. Aflaq describes
his brand of socialism as "scientific socialism plus
spirit.""4 Some authors go so far as to say that "the
Ba'thist vision of socialism is essentially non-Marxist, and
"
8
°Ibid. 345, 351. The Second Fundamental Principle proclaims
individual rights and Article 41 subordinates them to the state.
"
81Batatu, 736.





in fact anti-Marxist"8" although others suggest that
"socialism was perceived merely as an expedient for drawing
the deprived classes into the camp of unity."8 6
The socialist emphasis of the Ba'th is laid out in
the constitution. Articles 27 through 37 of the
constitution directly address the economic policies of the
party. The basic themes are equality, central planing, and
redistribution. On the point of redistribution, it was
clear that "struggle" to relieve the "minority" rich would
have to be made. 8" There was to be limited private
ownership and worker participation in management as well as
the abolishment of usury and exploitation. Aflaq was after
rapid industrialization and wanted the state to control all
aspects of the rise to industrial power.
2. Changes in Ideology
"By 1957 ... the Syrian Ba'th had become a babel of
conflicting ideological currents.""8 The rapid expansion of
the party and the merger with the Arab Socialist Party in
1952 brought many new, and sometimes conflicting, ideas into
the party. The biggest change was yet to come. In 1958 the
"







Syrian branch of the party dissolved itself with the merger
of Syria into the United Arab Republic (UAR)." 9
Aflaq's status within the party changed with these
events. The failures and lack of leadership of the party
were blamed on him. Younger members blamed him for not
leading the party through the tough times of the UAR and
others accused him of being out of touch with the day to day
needs of the party. 9"
The concept of "guided democracy" was brought up in
response to party failures." Some within the party
believed that Aflaq was misguided when he thought that the
problems of society would melt away once the Arab nation
established itself. In 1963 these ideas were codified by
the adoption of a much more focused and centralized platform
at the party's Sixth National Congress. The party shelved
the idea of parliamentary representative democracy and
declared that "the people's democracy, led by a vanguard
party (the Ba'th) would limit the political freedom of the
bourgeois and upper classes, just as those elements, when in








essentially eliminated any positive impacts that the
bourgeois elements might have made in favor of complete
management by the people, which were to be "socialized" by
the government. 93
The degeneration in solidarity between younger and
older party members of the Ba'th got continually worse in
the early 1960s. The party had originally not advocated the
use of violent means to come to power, but when the Ba'th in
Iraq ousted Qasim in 1963, Aflaq was quick to go to Baghdad
and proclaim unity. This type of contradiction continued
until a "new Ba'thist regime in Syria (including Hafiz al-
Asad) decided to disown the 'old guard' of Aflaq and
Bitar.-"9
The rise of the military in Syria was the final blow
to the Ba'th that Aflaq had worked to build. The military
rejected his ideas as out of date and his methods not
effective. Aflaq was the "old guard" and it was time for
him and those like him to go. He was not even allowed to
deliver a speech at the Eighth National Congress in April
1965.9' The old guard continued to fight the new wave of
Ba'thists but in the end they were totally rejected and
"13Ibid. Resolution No. 9. of Sixth National Congress.
9'Sluglett and Sluglett, 90.
"9'Devlin, 296.
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Aflaq ended up going to Iraq where he was received with
great reverence and caused the split in the Ba'th party that
exists to this day.
C. LEADERSHIP OF THE PARTY IN IRAQ
The Ba'th Party in Iraq got its start sometime in 1949
when it migrated from Syria. The growth and leadership of
the party can be broken into three periods. The first being
the period encompassing the arrival of the Ba'th in Iraq
through the 1958 revolution. The second period starting
from the emerging Qasim regime through the Ba'thist fall
from power in November 1963. And the final period covering
the dissolution of the Regional Command on 14 November 1963
through the re-emergence in the years leading up to the July
1968 return to power.
1. Early Iraqi Ba'th Leadership: (1949-1958)
In 1949 the first signs of Ba'th party organization
emerged in Iraq. The first recorded leader was Fayez
Isma'il, a Syrian student from Alexandretta who was studying
law in Baghdad. 96 His early efforts were carried on by the
first native Iraqi, Abd-ur-Rahmam ad-Damen, in 1950 when
Isma'il returned to Syria. 97 He too would only serve in the
96Batatu, 741. He notes that Isma'il was the brother of
Wahib al-Ghanim, a member of the Syrian Ba'th Command.
"97Ibid., 742.
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leadership capacity for about a year. By now the party had
spread from Baghdad to Nasiriyyah, Ramadi, Basrah, and Najaf
primarily through the work of students. 98
In 1951 the reigns of the emerging party were handed
over to Fu'ad al-Rikabi, a Shi'a from Nasiriyyah. His reign
would last for eight years and cover the rise of the party
from obscurity to prominence in Iraq. He took over a very
small party of around fifty members and increased the
membership to over 100 in 1952 when the Iraqi branch of the
party was recognized by the National Command in Syria. From
this point the party continued to grow with Rikabi being
elected to the National Command in 1954, as the Iraqi Region
representative, and reaching 289 by June 1955."' The
increase in military membership was especially notable
during the 1950s with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, Salih Mahdi
Ammash, and Abd-Allah Sultan becoming members."'°
Under Rikabi's leadership the party began to publish
a newspaper, first named al-Arabi al-Jadid (The New Arab)





0 0Khadduri, 11. The men are significant because they would
later become members of the Regional and National Commands and in
the case of al-Bakr the President of Iraq.
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1963."' Rikabi's Ba'th has been described as being "deeply
involved in anti-government demonstrations and other
opposition activities" throughout the 1950s."0" The primary
event prior to the revolution in 1958 was the strike
organized by Rikabi in June of 1955 protesting the forming
of the Baghdad Pact. Rikabi was arrested along with more
than a hundred others, only 22 went to trial, and the party
mimeograph machine was seized.'0 3 It was this event, which
the party quickly recovered from, that gained the Iraqi
Ba'th recognition from both the government and the popular
press.
In 1956, in response to the Suez Crisis, Rikabi led
the Iraqi Ba'th into a coalition with other nationalist
groups in opposition to the government and its association
with Britain. This was the last notable event of the Iraqi
Ba'th prior to the revolution, although the party continued
its agitation right up until the revolution in 1958.
2. Iraqi Ba'th Leadership Under Qasim: (1958-1963)
Fu'ad Rikabi was still the Regional Secretary at the
time of the revolution. While there were no Ba'thist








carrying out the revolution, the Ba'th had something just as
good. Rikabi was related to the second most important Free
Officer, Abd al-Salam Aref, as well as the fact that there
were Ba'thist officers who supported the revolution, such as
al-Bakr and Salih Mahdi Ammash.'" Upon the successful
completion of the revolution on 14 July 1958 the Ba'th,
Rikabi, got one seat on the cabinet, that of Minister of
Development. With this, the National Command appointed
Talib Husayn Shabib as Regional Secretary.105
The party, which Rikabi claimed to number over 300
with some 15,000 supporters,1 °6 immediately pushed for Iraq
to join the UAR. Qasim appears to have wanted no part of
the union and in protest Rikabi resigned in February 1959,
along with seven others.1°' Just ten months later an attempt
to assassinate Qasim would be made by the Ba'th. This event
was disastrous for the Iraqi Balth. It led to the Regional
Party being dissolved on 29 November 1959 and the fleeing of
the Iraqi Ba'th leadership. While Shabib worked to
... Devlin, 109. This relationship later reportedly got Aref
labelled as a Ba'thist when he was not.
10 5Ibid., 337. Appendix A and B list both National and
Regional Commands and Congresses for the Ba'th Party.
1' 6Sluglett and Sluglett, 90.
1 0 7Batatu, 813. Table 42-2.
42
reorganize the party, it was not until the ascendance of Ali
Salih al-Sa'di that the party would come back.
Al-Sa'di was promoted to Ba'th Party Regional
Secretary in May 1962. He was devoted to bringing an end to
the Qasim regime and worked toward that end. He spent time
building strength within the army, unions, schools, and
peasant groups.' 08 Under al-Sa'di's leadership it was
reported that there were "several plans made to overthrow
Qasim (but they) were intercepted by the regime and aborted"
by the regime.' 0 9 This activity continued until the party
was ready to move in 1963.
On 8 February 1963, the party finally came to power.
The party immediately established the National Council of
Revolutionary Command (NCRC) and appointed Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr as prime minister and Abd al-Salam Aref as president." 0
But, as Ba'th Party Regional Secretary and Minister of the
Interior, al-Sa'di retained the most power in the
government. Al-Sa'di had control of the paramilitary forces
and thus the streets, which gave him control over the
government.
"'°Devlin, 192.
109S.N. Mehdi, 9. It should be noted that this was against
the standing Ba'th policy of not using coups to achieve power.
"110IraQ: A Country Study, 53.
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This group, however, was far from homogeneous.
There were three distinct factions vying for control of the
party. There were "leftists" who were led by al-Sa'di,
"rightists" who were led by Talib Shabib, and the
"centrists" who were led by al-Bakr."' This competition for
power, which appeared to be a personal grab for power by al-
Sa'di,"I coupled with the brutal measures that the Ba'th was
pursuing in eliminating opposition groups, led this
competition to take drastic measures. The Ba'th installed
president, with the help of al-Bakr, removed al-Sa'di and
the majority of the Ba'th leadership on 18 November 1963.
3. Rebuilding Iraqi Ba'th Leadership: (1963-1968)
Although al-Bakr and some other Ba'thist remained in
the Aref government after November 1963, their power
diminished. In September 1964 the Ba'thists were reported
to be planning another grab for power.' 1 3 Aref, hearing of
this, removed from the government and repressed the Ba'th to
the point that by 1966 the Ba'th virtually ceased to
exist."14
"..Baram, 12.
"112Sluglett and Sluglett, 92. In June of 1963 al-Sa'di
announced, in opposition to the National Command, that "he as his
group were 'Marxist and Leftists' and that opponents were
'rightists and reactionary'."
"'Baram, 12, 13.
"'Sluglett and Sluglett, 98.
44
The party had fallen apart for the second time in
just a few years. The Regional Command was dissolved on 14
November 1963 and a provisional one appointed in February
1964.11' The years immediately following the fall from power
were characterized by the struggle for power between al-
Sa'di and al-Bakr. The National Congress brought this
struggle to an end in 1965 when al-Bakr was appointed
Regional Secretary, with Saddam Hussein as his deputy, and
al-Sa'di was expelled from the party.116
The next three years were spent rebuilding and
preparing for the time the Ba'th would again come to power.
Amatzia Baram in Culture, History & Ideol,-qv in the
Formation of Ba'thist IraQ, 1968-89 suggests five
developments in Iraq between 1963 and 1968 that would define
the Ba'th of the future and allow it to regain power in
Iraq. They are: the rift between the "pro" and "anti"
Syrian factions of the Ba'th, the failure of the Aref's to
defeat the Kurdish insurgency, the disappearance of Shi'a
leadership (al-Sa'di) from the Ba'th, the conflict with
Pahlavi Iran, and most importantly, the failure of the Iraqi
regime to take part in the June 1967 Six Day War."' As






Amatzia Baram puts it in his book:
The downfall of Abd al-Rahman Arif and the rise to power
of the Ba'th party in July 1968 were in no small measure
the outcome of the failure of the Iraqi army to support
Jordan and Syria effectively in their struggle against
Israel. "'
On 17 July 1968 the Ba'th party, led by Ahmad Hasan
al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein, in coalition with some
disgruntled non-Ba'thist military officers executed a coup
that sent Abd al-Rahman Aref in exile and brought the Ba'th




IV. THE BA'TH PARTY AFTER 1968
The Ba'th Party did return to power on 17 July 1968, but
only with the decisive help of non-Ba'thist military
officers, "Abd al-Razzaz al-Nayif, the Director of Military
Intelligence, Colonel Ibrahim "Abd al-Rahman al-Da'ud, the
commander of the Republican Guard, and Colonel Sa'dun
Ghaidan, the commander of the 10th armored brigade, which
was the Republican Guards tank regiment.' 19 As payment for
their participation in the coup these three men were awarded
the positions of Prime Minister, al-Nayif, Minister of
Defense, al-Da'ud, and command of the Republican Guard,
Ghaidan, as well as places on the newly formed Revolutionary
Command Council (RCC) in the government that was formed
immediately after the coup.120
The Ba'th leadership, Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, would have to
wait until the end of the month to complete a Ba'thist
takeover of the government. It was not until 30 July 1968
"119Sluglett and Sluglett, 112. A complete chronology of the
events of early July 1968 through the end of the month can be
found in Iraa Since 1958, p.110-116.
12°Ibid., 114. The RCC consisted of seven men, all military
officers, of which three were confirmed Balth Party members and
one of the non-Ba'th members was a cousin of al-Bakr's from
Takrit.
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that al-Da'ud and al-Nayif were removed from the
government.' 21 The other member of the non-Ba'th group,
Ghaidan, was converted, or at least coerced, to become a
Ba'th Party member and continue on in his position.' 2 2 So a
second coup had taken place and as Phebe Marr puts it in The
Modern History of Irag, "The coup of 30 July had put al-Bakr
and the military Ba'thists in power, but the Ba'th position
was still precarious."' 2 3 With fewer than 5,000 Ba'th Party
members on the roles in 1968 the party had to build a
sustainable government.
It is the government that is built and that controls
Iraq to this day that will be the focus of this chapter. It
will be examined by looking into four distinct areas of the
regime from 1968 to the present. Leadership will be
addressed first because traditionally it has been the
defining characteristic of most, if not all, regimes in the
region. It most certainly has defined the Iraqi regime
under al-Bakr and even more so since the advent to power of
Saddam Hussein, who has redefined the Ba'th in a reflection
of himself. Second, the institutionalization that the Ba'th
Party has been able to generate throughout Iraq in its more
'
2
'Marr, 212. Al-Da'ud was sent to Jordan to visit the Iraqi
force stationed there and told not to return, he was given an
ambassadorial slot, and al-Nayif was sent out of the country as
ambassador to Morocco.
122Sluglett and Sluglett, 116.
12 3Marr, 213. 48
than two decades of control. Third, an examination will be
made of some of the policies, both economic and social, that
the Ba'th have instituted. And finally, a look at the
legitimacy that the Ba'th has gained through the use of the
various items mentioned above as well as through the use of
its distinctively Iraqi Ba'thist ideology."'
A. LEADERSHIP
With the Ba'thist desire to engineer change in Iraq from
the top down, the leadership of the party, and thus the
country, has been of paramount importance. Also indicative
of the type of leadership that will be brought to the
forefront in Iraq is the suggestion by Majid Khadduri in
Socialist Iraq: A Study in Middle Eastern Politics Since
1968 that "The Arabs yearn for a 'strong' leader to preside
over their destiny; if he possesses integrity,
straightforwardness, and strength of character, he is likely
to receive the support and confidence of the people."' 2 5
Phebe Marr has suggested that there have been roughly
seven factors identifying the leadership of the Ba'th:
124Phebe Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th." in Ideology and Power in the Middle East, ed. Peter J.
Chelkowski and Robert Pranger, (Durham: Duke University Press,
1988), 186. This article lays out a workable model for an
examination of the Ba'th Party and its role in shaping Iraq and





ethnic Arab, Sunni Muslim, narrow geographic base, family
ties, poor to lower-middle-class, a common age group, and a
commonality of experiences including jail.' 26 These factors
are true for the present Ba'thist regime in Iraq and they
for the most part hold true, with the exception being
religion, for the previous leadership groups as well. While
the various leadership groups have not always been agreed as
to the direction the party should be taking, they have had
the most important characteristic of homogeneity within
their particular groups. This is true of the early as well
as present day Iraqi Ba'th leadership. The first Iraqi
Ba'th Party leader, Fa'ud al-Rikabi, was a Shi'a and his
following came from this group as well as from relatives.
When Ali Salih al-Sa'di was the party leader the al-Rikabi
forces were pushed aside in favor of al-Sa'di's followers,
"petty criminals" froui the Baghdad area. This precedent
continued th:rugh Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein,
both who have relied on relatives and others from the
predominately Sunni area around Takrit.127
The 17-30 July 1968 coup concentrated power in the hands
of al-Bakr with Saddam Hussein as his second in command.
This section will focus on the leadership period of al-Bakr
126Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 192, 193.
127Sluglett and Sluglett, 108, 109.
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and the subsequent assumption of power and total dominance
of the Ba'th Party and the country by Saddam Hussein.
1. Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr: (1968-1979)
When al-Bakr assumed the leadership of the Iraqi
Ba'th Party in 1965 he was 51 years old. His life to that
point had been filled with jobs ranging from teaching in
Iraqi schools to government as well as being an officer in
the army. To understand his leadership of Iraq from July
1968 through July 1979 a few things must be examined. His
life history until he assumed the Presidency, how he and the
Ba'th came to power in 1968, how he consolidated and
maintained his position within the Ba'th as well as the
country after 1968, and his relationship with other party
figures, notably Saddam Hussein, are most important.
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr was born in 1914 to relatively
poor parents in the town of Tikrit. His early life was
spent studying in Baghdad where he entered a teachers
college in 1929. In 1932 he graduated and went on to be a
teacher in the primary school system for six years. During
this time he was exposed to the fervent nationalism that was
spreading throughout the country as well as the continued
poverty that was the defining characteristic of Iraq at the
time. It seems that he was affected by the Bakr Sadqi coup
in 1936 because in 1938 he left the teaching profession and
entered the military college in Baghdad. He was
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commissioned a second lieutenant in 1942, just after the
British completed their suppression of the Rashid Ali forces
in Iraq.128
It is during al-Bakr's time in the Army that he
apparently received his calling to politics. According to
Khadduri, "Bakr's ambition to play a role in politics was
aroused when the Free Officers movement began to spread
secretly in the Army in 1952."129 Al-Bakr joined the Ba'th
Party sometime during the fifties and was one of the members
of the group of officers that helped Qasim overthrow the
monarchy. He served in the army until his forced
retirement, for supporting Aref against Qasim, in October of
1958.
Once out of the army, al-Bakr appears to have worked
towards the goals of the party. He would come back to the
government in the 1963 Ba'th coup and be a part of the
forces that helped Aref rid the government of the Ba'thist
leadership of al-Sa'di in November 1963.13" After falling
from the grace of the Aref government, al-Bakr spent time in
jail for his anti-Aref stances. His time in jail was spent
"
28Khadduri, 69, 70, 71. The author gives a brief and
comprehensive background to al-Bakr.
129 Ibid, 71.
130Baram, 12. As mentioned before the "centrist" faction of
the Ba'th Party was led by al-Bakr and would remain in the Aref
government until September 1964.
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consolidating his leadership, gained in 1965 at the Seventh
Ba'th National Congress, of the party and rebuilding for the
eventual coup of July 1968.
As already related, the Ba'th, under the leadership
of al-Bakr, allied itself with the military non-Ba'thists in
order to achieve success in the coup of 17 July 1968. The
subsequent removal of the non-Balth forces from the new
regime show that the alliance was a tactical move on al-
Bakr's part and that he was the one calling the shots within
the party.1 3' It is from this point that the consolidation
of power for both al-Bakr and the Ba'th Party takes place.
Marr points out further in assessing the leadership
of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr that,
In addition to keeping the army in line, he projected a
paternal image that somewhat mitigated the party's
reputation for harshness. As a practicing Muslim and a
known moderate, al-Bakr appealed to the more conservative
and nationalist elements in the population, and as a
consummate manipulator, al-Bakr often helped mediate
conflicts within the party.1
32
So it is quite apparent that al-Bakr appealed to those
around him because he was, at age 54, still young enough to
have gone through the trials of bringing the party to
prominence, while being at least ten years older than the
131 Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 209.
132Ibid., 218.
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rest of the party leadership. 133 He also appealed in that he
brought a certain amount of legitimacy to the leadership as
he was the only member of the party to have held senior
positions in both the government and the army prior to the
1968 coup.
After riding the regime of the Nayif and Da'ud
followers, al-Bakr went on to rid himself of any competition
that might come from within the party. He set up systems of
control that would allow only those personally loyal to
himself to attain high positions within the government.' 3
Ai-Bakr was not "prepared to allow political opponents to
conspire against the new regime, not even under the guise of
'loyal opposition'."135 With this in mind al-Bakr eliminated
the military opposition that was led by Hardan al-Tikriti
and Salih Mahdi Ammash. He removed al-Tikriti in 1970 and
Ammash in 1971. The opposition to his leadership was
effectively wiped out, through purges, by 1974 when al-Bakr
"was the only former army officer still in a key post."" 6
"133Sluglett dnd Sluglett, 116.
134al-Khalil, 25.
"135Khadduri, 32.
"136Marr, 215,216. Hardan al-Takriti went to Kuwait where he
was assassinated in 1971 and Ammash went on to become the
Ambassador to the Soviet Union and eventually to obscurity.
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Al-Bakr survived numerous attempts to oust him from
power, with the most notable one coming in 1973 when the
Director of Iraq's Internal Security service attempted to
assassinate both al-Bakr ad Saddam Hussein.13' The plot was
foiled and the perpetrators were caught and executed. But
the most significant result of the assassination attempt was
the new found power and position that Saddam Hussein would
take and continue to build until his assumption of the
Presidency in July 1979. In effect the two ruled almost as
co-equals in Iraq from shortly after this incident.131
2. Saddam Hussein: (1979-Present)
Before dealing with how Saddam Hussein has managed
to consolidate his position as leader of the Ba'th Party and
transform the Ba'th into an extension of himself a look into
his background and how he got to the position of leadership
must be made.
Saddam Hussein was born on 28 April 1937 in al-Auja,
a suberb of Tikrit, to a life of poverty where he had no
father and his stepfather regularly beat him.139 After years
137Iraq: A Country Study, 243.
138Marr, 229. She notes that Saddam began to take on a
greatly increased public role starting in 1974 and by 1977
ministers who should have been reporting to al-Bakr were
reporting to Sadd- for virtually everything.
13 9Efraim Karsh and Inari Rautsi, Saddam Hussein: A Political
BioQraphy, (New York: The Free Press, 1991), 7, 10. Much has
been made by the Iraqi press that Saddam was born in Tikrit,
55
of neglect and abuse, he was sent to be raised by his uncle,
Khairallah Talfah. Talfah was a fervent nationalist who had
been dismissed from the army and temporarily jailed for his
involvement in the 1941 Rashid Ali affair. It is from his
uncle that many attribute Saddam's early political
aspirations.'"
The schooling of Saddam Hussein started in 1947 at
age ten. He went to Baghdad in 1955 after primary school to
continue his education. After failing the entrance
examinations into the military schools of the day, he
continued on to civilian high school where he would get his
start in politics in 1956.141 From this point on, his life
became a part of the greater Ba'thist struggle to gain
power. He quickly gained the reputation and image of a
which is the birthplace of the great Muslim leader, Salah al-Din,
in 1138. In truth, Saddam was born in Al-Auja, a suburb of
Tikrit, and the great leader that was born there was actually
Kurdish and not Arab.
"'
4 Ray T. Bradley, "Saddam Hussein Portrait of an Arab
Leader" (Masters Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1991), 25.
1'4Ibid., 12. The actual dates are not clear. Khadduri
suggests that he joined the Ba'th Party in 1956 around the time
of the widespread demonstrations against the Baghdad Pact and
Karsh maintains that he did not join until the next year, but it
is safe to say he got his first taste of opposition politics in
1956.
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"'shaqawah', a local term denoting a kind of tough or bully
- a man to be feared."
1 4 2
Saddam became involved with the assassination
attempt against Qasim in 1959 as a junior Ba'th Party
supporter and was forced to flee the country."'3 He spent
time in Syria, where he met Aflaq and gained full party
membership, and eventually Egypt, where he finished high
school and began law school. He returned to Iraq in 1963 to
take a minor position in the regime after the Ba'th seized
power in February. 1 4  His most significant action during
this time was his joining the faction of the Ba'th Party
headed by his relative from Tikrit, General Ahmad Hasan al-
Bakr. It is this action that would catapult Saddam into the
Ba'thist leadership circle after the Ba'th fell from power
later that year.
After the fall of the Ba'th in November 1963, Saddam
Hussein maintained his close ties with al-Bakr and was for a
time in 1963 the Provisional Regional Secretary of the Ba'th
while the National Command got things within the Iraqi Ba'th
142Marr, 220.
14 3Khadduri, 72, 73. The regime has made this event into a
big deal and used it to glorify Saddam Hussein as a fearless and
great fighter, leader, strategist, and revolutionary. There have
even been movies made depicting his actions.
"
14 4Karsh and Rautsi, 22. They state he was appointed to the
Central Bureau for Peasants.
57
sorted out. He quickly fell in line with al-Bakr and became
the second in command of the Iraqi Ba'th during the
rebuilding phase of the party from 1964 through 1968. He
spent time in jail as a political prisoner and although he
is not reported to have played an active role in the 17 July
1968 coup, he certainly played a significant role in the 30
July coup that eliminated any non-Ba'thist opposition.14 5
Saddam Hussein was Deputy Chairman of the Ba'th
Party Regional Command in 1968 and in that position he was
in control of the party's security organization as well as
the popular militia that was being formed, both traditional
sources of power with the Ba'th Party."46 His star was
rising fast and as Phebe Marr notes, there are really three
factors that account for his rise to power:
First, his capacity and willingness to shelter behind
President Bakr, the man who had the more visible position
in the regime until the mid-1970s. Second, his astute
understanding of, and ability to manipulate, domestic
politics. Third, his ability to take the lead in matters
of state, even when they involved risk.147
However, it was the coup attempt in 1973 that
allowed Saddam to reorganize the internal security




5Khadduri, 51, 52, 53.
1'6Bradley, 58.
1'"Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 197.
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loyal to him, which gave him the power he would eventually
use to assume and consolidate his own leadership position in
1979. The aftermath of the coup attempt allowed Saddam to
purge members of the Ba'th Party suspected of disloyalty and
to reorganize the internal security organization into three
separate organs that were all accountable and staffed with
people that were loyal to him personally. He was
effectively taking over the country without having to be
accountable for being in charge. It would come down to the
failing health of al-Bakr in the later part of the decade
that would push Saddam into taking the reigns of power for
himself. As has been stated, "there is little doubt that
Husayn [Hussein] was impatient to assume official title to
the power he held in actual fact [in 1979], and he probably
engineered the older man's [al-Bakr] retirement."148
It was on 16 July 1979 that President al-Bakr
appeared on television and announced his resignation and to
pass the leadership torch over to Saddam Hussein, who was
immediately sworn in as President.' 49 With the rise to the
top leadership position completed, Saddam immediately set
out to consolidate his position just as al-Bakr had done
before him.
1"eMarr, The Modern History of Irag, 229.
'
49Sluglett and Sluglett, 208.
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Shortly after Saddam Hussein assumed the primary
leadership role in both the Ba'th party and the country it
has been reported that there was a coup attempt by
opposition forces within the Ba'th leadership. It is not
clear whether or not there was actually a coup plot, but it
is certain that Saddam eliminated any opposition that might
have been brewing. With al-Bakr stepping aside in July,
Saddam purged, through their "conspiracy" in the plot, the
Regional Command Council of five members and eliminated
about 500 other "high-ranking Ba'thists" by 1 August 1979."'°
He immediately packed the Ba'th leadership with party
members who were either related to himself or with
associates who were longtime friends.' 51
Saddam was able to complete his consolidation of
power in rather short order due to his extensive control of
the party even before he became president. Because he
controlled the internal security organization, he was able
to effectively eliminate most opposition even before it
could take shape. Saddam has been quoted as saying,
I know there are scores of people plotting to kill me. I
know they are conspiring to kill me long before they
actually start planning to do it. This enables me to get
150al-Khalil, 70.
"
5 1Adeed Dawisha, "The Politics of War: Presidential
Centrality, Party Power, Political Opposition," in Iraq in
Transition, ed. Frederick Axelgard (Boulder, Westview Press,
1986), 23.
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them before they have the faintest chance of striking at
me 152
This a quote that Saddam Hussein has lived by for
the last 15 years. His hold on power has been tenacious.
Saddam has used purges, the internal security forces, the
media, the postal service, his family, and even history to
retain his grip on the leadership position in Iraq.
Throughout his tenure as the leader of Iraq, Saddam
has executed, imprisoned, or expelled any opposition forces
either in or out of the government. He has executed both
generals for failing at the battle front against Iran and
religious leaders for their opposition to his secular
policies."•3 The use of his internal security forces for
imprisonment and torture of Iraqi's has been widely reported
and is said to include acts against children and
bystanders."S4 The use of for'7e has also extended to the
civilian population with campaigns of resettlement for Kurds
and deportation of opposition Shi'a to pacify resistance to
the Ba'th leadership. As Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh
"
52Karsh and Rautsi, 2. He is reported to have said this
shortly after coming to power in 1979.
"
1 53Saddam has executed numerous high ranking military men
for their failures in both the war with Iran and the war with the
coalition forces over Kuwait in 1990, 1991. He also executed the
Shi'a religious leader Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Sadr, along
with his sister, in 1980.
15'Bradley, 47.
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noted in their book The Gulf Conflict 1990-1991, "The Use of
physical force to promote his political ends had been the
hallmark of the Iraqi leader's career form the start." 155
The government controlled media and postal service
are two other sources of his staying power. Al-Khalil
reports that the media is so biased towards Saddam Hussein
that hardly a day can go by without a major news story about
his accomplishments, the radio is filled with his name and
speeches, the streets are filled with pictures of him, and
there are even Saddam T-shirts and wrist watches for sale in
the shops.' 56 Saddam dominates the stamp industry as well.
He has "reigned supreme on Iraqi stamps since 1979" with his
first appearance coming in 1976.1"7 Saddam has been
portrayed in movies and has taken official credit for
virtually everything good that has happened to Iraq since
1968 and pushed off responsibility for everything bad.
Saddam's pervasive use of family members in
positions of authority has been well documented. While true
"'
55Lawrence Freedman and Efraim Karsh, The gulf Conflict
1990-1991: Diplomacy and War in the New World Order (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993), 19.
156al-Khalil, 110. Even as late as the summer of 1993, The
New York Times reported a story about an exhibition of portraits
of Saddam Hussein in a Baghdad art gallery.
15 7Donald M. Reid, "The Postage Stamp: A Window on Saddam
Hussein's Iraq," Middle East Journal, 47, no.11 (Winter 1993):
77, 79.
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that family ties have been no assurance of job security, he
has fired several family members for apparent mistakes,
being a direct family member or an extended family member
has assured the opportunity to serve. It is this clan
organization that Saddam has relied upon to form the
foundation of his power in Iraq.' 5 8
His boldest attempts at glorifying himself as the
leader of Iraq have been his attempts to associate himself
with the great leaders of Iraq's past. He at one point was
having bricks cast with his name on them to be placed in the
walls of Babylon, which he was having reconstructed, just as
the name of Nebuchadnezzar was inscribed on the originals.' 59
The comparison with Salah al-Din is also often used in the
popular media to foster Saddam's image. While these have
been popular myths that Saddam has built around himself he
has also commissioned historical records searches that have
"proven" him to be a "descendent of the family of the
Prophet, Ali and al-Husayn."160
In concluding this section on the leadership of
Saddam Hussein it is appropriate to address the way in which
Saddam has transformed the Ba'th Party in Iraq in an
"




extension of himself. It is the leader who defines what the
organization will look like and in Saddam's case it is
entirely true that the Ba'th has become an extension of
himself. As mentioned before, he has packed the party and
government with people that are related to and personally
loyal to him. Those people in positions of leadership owe
their status to him and thus obligated to ensure his
success.
Saddam Hussein has been in charge of the government
for more than 15 years and in effective charge of the Ba'th
Party for almost 20. It is clear that he as an individual,
has done more to shape the Iraqi Ba'th Party than all the
other leaders that the Ba'th has had combined. 16' He has
lived by the laws of the jungle. To Saddam, it is either
kill or be killed. It is with this view of the leadership
of the Ba'th in general and of Saddam Hussein in particular
that the rest of this chapter must be viewed. Everything
that the government has done in Iraq for the last 25 years
has been done to ensure the retention of power by the
leadership, notably Saddam Hussein.




It has been said that, "No revolution can succeed
without a high degree of institutionalization. The Ba'th has
learned this lesson well."' 62 The institutionalization of
the Ba'th Party into Iraqi society has been one of the
paramount goals since the coup in 1968. As has been stated
before, the Ba'th took control of the government in July
1968 with fewer than 5000 party members. With Iraq's
history of military coups and instability of government, the
Ba'thist hold on power was not assured to last. Their
experience in 1963 had taught the leadership that in order
to keep their grasp on power they needed to get their ideas
and goals across to the people.
The Ba'th Party has approached their goal of
institutionalization from every direction of society. They
have concentrated on penetrating society at every level,
through every age group, and every organization. In this
section, four of the most critical segments of Ba'thist
institutionalization will be addressed. First, the
political institutionalization of the Ba'th into Iraqi
society will be examined because it is through this
organization that the Ba'th is able to reach out to other
segments of society. Second, the institutionalization of
162Ibid., 186.
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the Ba'th throughout the bureaucracy will be probed. Third,
an examination of the institutionalization of the party and
its ideas throughout the civil sector of society will be
made. And finally, the Ba'thist institutionalization of the
military will be explored because it is this group that has
traditionally provided the challenge to government power in
Iraq.
1. Political Institutionalization
The Ba'th regime has maintained control over Iraqi
society, "not through this Tikrit network, but mainly
through an elaborate party organization."' 63 This is not a
new idea, but it is one that requires an extensive party
organization and a commitment to party unity by every level
of the organization. To achieve dominance in Iraqi society,
the Ba'th has set about controlling, or Ba'thizing, the
politics of Iraq in the following ways: by creating an
extensive internal party organization and fostering its
growth, by maintaining a paramilitary organization that is
loyal only to the party, by attempting to bring other
political groups into the system where they can be
controlled by the Ba'th, and by creating a National Assembly




The Ba'th Party organization in Iraq as it stands
today is made up of six levels, as opposed to the original
seven levels from before the Syrian and Iraqi Ba'th split,
and has been estimated in 1984 to have somewhere between
25,000 and 50,000 full time members with a support base of
about 1 , 5 0 0 , 0 0 0 .1C" The six levels of the party are: the
CELL (halagah), which consists of three to seven active
members and functions at the neighborhood level, the SECTION
(firgah), which consists of three to seven cells and is
responsible for recruitment and policy execution for a small
subsection of a city or town, the DIVISION (shu'bah), which
consists of two to five sections and is the first level of
the party that has an elected command over a part of a
medium sized city, the BRANCH (far'), which consists of at
least two divisions is the level that exercises control of
party activities over an entire medium sized city or part of
a major city such as Baghdad, the AREA COMMAND (tanzim) is
the level which controls a regional area of Iraq, of which
there are five, the highest level is the REGIONAL COMMAND
which controls the party at the national level and which




The Ba'th has also sought to control society through
the use of its paramilitary force. This is basically the
same organization that was responsible for the campaign of
terror when the Ba'th took control of the government in
1963. It has been reorganized and is far bigger now than it
has ever been. The Ba'thist paramilitary organization has
grown from a force of about 50,000 in 1977 to a force of
over 650,000 in 1987, with the majority of the growth
occurring after the start of the war with Iran.166
It was renamed the Popular Army in 1974 and has
taken a place within the structure of Iraqi society as a
parallel institution to the army.1 67 Its mission has
remained constant throughout the length of the Ba'thist
rule. It was "set up by the Ba'th to act as an exclusively
party security organ."168 While it has acted as such, it has
also taken on a more conventional role when necessary. It
has been reported that the Popular Army fought as
coordinated forces during the war with Iran and that it was
used as a security force during the 1990-1991 war over
Kuwait.
166Irag: A Country Study, 263.
167Dawisha, 25. This organization also goes by names such
as, the Peoples Army, the Popular Militia, and the National Guard




The Ba'th sought early on to bring the other
"progressive" political groups into line by offering
incentives and a promise of freedom to function within the
system. The National Action Charter was drafted in 1971 in
an attempt to allow integration of the various groups within
Iraq to participate in the governing of the country.' 6 9 This
act was followed up in 1974 with the creation of the
Progressive National Front (PNF) which was designed to give
the Kurdish, Communist, and other non-represented parties as
well as the Ba'th Party a say in the affairs of state."'7
This new organization did open the door to the other parties
during the middle of the decade. It also allowed the Ba'th
to control their access to government and to contain their
growth. It was shortly after the front was put into effect
that the 1975 Algiers Agreement was signed and the Ba'th
cracked down on the Kurds. It was also only a few years
until the Ba'th cracked down on the communists and either
imprisoned or forced into exile virtually the entire Iraqi
Communist Party."'7
169Irag: A Country Study, 194.
170Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 227.
"'Iraq: A Country Study, 195. The Algiers Agreement was
significant in that it cut off Iranian and US support for the
Kurdish opposition and effectively broke the back of the Kurdish
movement and the Marxist coup in Afghanistan scared the Ba'th
enough to rid the country of the potential threat that the
communists represented.
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The Ba'th has also attempted to bring the population
at large into the political system through the election of a
National Assembly. The election of a National Assembly was
something that was promised from the very early days of the
regime, in the 1970 interim Constitution, but that was not
implemented until after Saddam Hussein became President.
The 1979 draft law to create a National Assembly was one of
his first acts after taking office. The law was promulgated
in March 1980 and the elections took place on 20 June 1980
with the first meeting on 30 June 1980.172
The qualifications to become a member of the 250
seat National Assembly were strictly controlled by the
Ba'th. A person had to be Iraqi born, at least 25 years
old, have an Iraqi father, not be married to a foreigner,
and not be a member of any of the previous ruling classes
from within Iraq. But the most important criteria was that
"candidates had to believe in the principles of the 17-30
July revolution."' 7 3 Once a person decided to run for office
he was scrutinized by a committee of Ba'thists who were to
ensure his loyalty. Thus the Ba'th Party effectively
controlled the outcome of the election. Reports of the




75 percent of the seats and 100 percent of the vote with
similar results in 1984 and 1989."'~
2. Bureaucratic institutionalization
Samir al-Khalil, in his book Re~ublic of Fear,
summed up the Ba'th Party's relationship with the
bureaucracy this way, "The leader must function as an
extension of the party and thus does define the party to
some extent, but without the bureaucracy he [and the party]
would be lost."17 5 The Ba'th Party set about
institutionalizing their rule immediately after they took
power in 1968. In the 25 years they have been in charge
they have attempted to set up a constitution, a bureaucratic
structure, and the means to enforce and institutionalize
their idea of government and to hold on power.
The Ba'th implemented an interim Constitution in
197 0116 and have since revised and even announced a new
constitution as late as 1990, but nothing has been done with
regards to its implementation. The constitution allows for
four branches of government; the Revolutionary Command
Council (RCC), the National Assembly, the President, and the
"
74Dawisha, 26, 27. the voting population in Iraq for the
first election was estimated at 6,000,000 with universal suffrage
for citizens over age 18.
17 5 a1-Khalil, 124.
176 Khadduri, 183-198. As amended in 1973 and 1974. This
document is also known as the Provisional Constitution.
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Judiciary. The way it is written, the president and the RCC
end up with most of the powers of government."' The powers
given to the Ba'th by the constitution are far reaching.
They have the ability to appoint judges, control industry,
provide all essential services, and because they have
manipulated the electorial process with regards to the
National Assembly, they have to answer to no one but other
party members. The constitution has clearly been a
propaganda tool for the "pan-Arabist" and "Arab Socialist"
factions within the party.
The use of the courts has further institutionalized
the Ba'th Party's control over society. Immediately after
taking power in 1968 special, "revolutionary" courts were
set up to rid Iraq of any "security" threats."8 These
courts were used by the Ba'thists to eliminate any
opposition and to further the consolidation of the regime.
The 1970 Constitution also gives the President the right to
appoint judges.' 7 9 This puts all judicial authority in the
hands of the Ba'th Party.
"17Ibid., 34, 35.
178Ibid., 42.
179Ibid., 193. Article 58 gives the President of the
Republic the right to appoint both civil and religious judges and
to terminate their services when needed.
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The size and growth of government under the Ba'th
has also led to the integration of Ba'thist ideas in
society. The growth of government in Iraq has been
phenomenal. The non-military side of government has grown
from under 10,000 in 1938 and just over 20,000 in 1958 to
well over 835,000 in 1980.180 This translates into almost
five percent of the population owing their livelihood to the
Ba'th Party and if you add the army into this figure it
jumps to almost ten percent. This growth has also allowed
the Bath to per trate every bureaucratic organization in
Iraq, from city hall to national economic planning boards to
the neighborhood level trash collectors.
The most significant organization set up by the
Ba'th Party to facilitate the institutionalization of their
rule has been the internal security organization. Although
initially set up immediately after the coup in 1968 it did
not rise to prominence until after its reorganization in
1973. The three separate parts of the security apparatus,
the "Amn", State Internal Security, the "Estikhbarat", or
Military Intelligence, and the "Mukhabarat", or Party





While no concrete numbers are available for the size
of the security forces within Iraq it has been estimated
that "one-fifth of the economically active Iraqi labour
force (about 3.4 million people) were institutionally
charged during peacetime (1980) with one form or another of
violence."" 2 The internal security organization has been
credited with the rounding up and elimination of opposition
forces and with the maintenance of order in times of crisis,
such as the war with Iran and the conflict in Kuwait where
it has been reported that deserters would be shot.' 83
3. Civil Institutionalization
The Ba'th Party has complete control over virtually
every aspect of civil affairs. They control the media, the
trade unions, and organized associations of every kind.
Their actions have allowed them to penetrate into "every
sphere of public and domestic life."184 With control over
such vast economic resources, primarily oil, they have been
able to create and support organizations that have been
favorable to them.
"'
2Ibid., 38. al-Khalil goes further to describe a kind of
"Big Brother" society where children inform on their parents and
neighborhoods all inform the security forces about the activities
of their neighbors, p.61.
"'
8 Dilip Hiro, The LonQest War: The Iran-IraQ Military
Conflict (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall Inc., 1991), 61,
62.
"'
4Sluglett and Sluglett, 228.
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The Ba'th controlled media in Iraq is a tool of
institutionalization. Right from the very start in 1963185
the Ba'th has used the media to get the attention of the
people. There have been televised trials and executions as
well as countless speeches by the party leadership. The only
things that appear are the approved versions in accordance
with Ba'thist doctrine. The state has manipulated the media
so much that it has been compared to that of the former
Soviet Union and to other Eastern block countries. 18 6
While trade unions appeared first during the Qasim
regime"8 7 their use as a tool of institutionalization was not
realized until the Ba'th took over Iraq in 1968. The
Ba'thist control over trade unions has "mushroomed since
1968."18 and the use of union to distribute the party's
message has grown right along with the unions. Marr reports
that the "Ba'th controls their [the unions] activities
through election of Ba'thists to positions in their
"
85Uriel Dann, Iraq under Oassem (New York: Praeger,
1969),370. The media was used to falsely report Qasim's death
which appears to have significantly affected the army's response
to the coup. It has also been reported that Qasim's dead body
was shown on Iraqi television to discourage opposition to the
coup.
186al-Khalil, 84.
187Irag: A Country Study, 50, 51.
188Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 188.
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hierarchies.""89 Virtually all of Iraq's public sector
workers had belonged to government sponsored trade unions up
until 1987 and the private sector workers were not allowed
to form unions. But the situation changed in 1987 with the
implementation of a law abolishing Iraq's labor law, which
had promised lifetime employment. Once this was done the
Ba'th, which already had control of the public sector
employees, started to gain more control over the private
sector workers who were now allowed to join trade unions."19
The party control over the workers is very much complete.
The party has made enormous inroads in creating
professional associations and other civic organizations to
get its platform across. The Ba'th party has created an
extensive network of youth organizations. They have
organizations for children under ten years old, the
Pioneers, and another for children 11 to 15 years old, the
Vanguards, and still another for the youth between the ages
of 16 and 20, the Youth Organization."' There are also
groups for women sucl. as the General Federation of Women.
It is with these and other groups, which are lined up
according to occupation or neighborhood, that the Ba'th uses
"
89Ibid.
19°Irag: A Country Study, 128.
191al-Khalil, 76, 77.
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to indoctrinate the population and institutionalize the
Ba'thist ideals.
4. Military Institutionalization
Between 1936 and 1968 there were 12 successful
military coups in Iraq with the last one being the Ba'thist
in 1968."'" The military has always played the central role
in Iraq politics and its influence has been dominant. When
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein came to power in 1968
it was their central purpose to bring the military to heel.
The Ba'th Party as an organization has sought to bring the
army under control by eliminating any opposition forces
within it, by infiltrating Ba'thists into it ranks and by
politicizing it.
From the very beginning the Ba'th has sought to
eliminate any military opposition to their rule. The cases
of al-Tikriti and Ammash served notice on the military that
the civilian wing of the party was to be in control. This
line of reasoning has continued throughout the 25 years of
Ba'thist rule. Saddam Hussein is known to have executed
from several to several hundred officers during the war with
Iran for not following orders or suspected disloyalty19' and




the execution of top commanders for the failures during the
Kuwait confrontation of 1990-1991 has been commonplace."'
By infiltrating the military the Ba'th has always
been able to ensure that no plotting or opposition movements
could form. Immediately after taking power in 1968 the
Ba'th started handing out commissions to party members and
it quickly moved to restrict admission to the military
college in Baghdad to party members.1 95 There are "Party
commissars at all levels" of the military who report
directly to the party.' 96 Another aspect of the Ba'thization
of the army has been the tremendous growth the armed forces
have seen during the Ba'thist reign. The Armed forces have
almost tripled in size just in the period 1977 through 1987,
with reserve forces doubling over the same period.197 The
Ba'th is the only political party that is allowed to recruit
in the army, but all army personnel are barred from ever
joining another party whether they are in uniform or out,
and those who disobey are subject to the death penalty.198
"
9 4Freedman and Karsh, 419.
"'
9 Sluglett and Sluglett, 120.
196Ibid., 206.
197 Iraq: A Country Study, 263. the war with Iran accounts
for the dramatic increase but even after the war the army was not
significantly demobilized and it appears that even in 1993 that
it is still of significant size.
"19'Dawisha, 22.
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The party goal has been for the army to see itself
as an "ideologically committed military wing of the
party."199 Although some authors have called the army a
potential trouble spot for the regime it has not appeared to
be the case. The Ba'th has used the army as a tool of
repression and under Ba'thist control it has become what
some call "an army metamorphosed into a creature of the
Ba'th. ,200 The armed forces have long been used for fighting
the internal battle of Iraq, such as against the Kurds in
the North and the Shi'as in the South. Commanders have
received some autonomy in use of tactics but the primary
control of the armed forces has rested with the Ba'th in
general and Saddam Hussein in particular.
C. POLICIES
In 1992 it was estimated that the population of Iraq had
reached almost 18.5 million people with an annual growth
rate of 3.7 percent .2111 When the Ba'th Party took over the
country in July 1968 the population was estimated to be in
the neighborhood of 8 million.2° With the tremendous growth
"'9Ibid., 26.
200 al-Khalil, 28.
2°"Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1992), 161.
°212The Middle East and North Africa, 14th ed. 1967-1968, S.v.
"Iraq."
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in population over the time that the Bath has been in power
the regime has had to make some very important decisions
regarding the economic and social health of the country.
Being committed to socialist methods from the beginning has
driven some of the policies, but it has been the desire to
remain in power that has driven others. As one author has
described the situation the Bath Party was in soon after
the coup, "In the search for stability, the government was
aware of the need to improve the living standards of its
people. ti)3
Fortunately, Iraq has vast reserves of crude oil and
during the tenure of the Ba'th, the price of oil has gone
up. Income from these deposits rose steadily during the
1970s and was projected to go even higher during the 1980s,
but the war with Iran from 1980-1988 and the war over Kuwait
in 1990-1991 and its aftermath have seriously hurt Iraq's
access to international markets.
The Ba'th Party has had a profound impact on the
population in all aspects of daily life. The decisions made
by the leadership with regard to policy are unquestioned and
final so their importance has to be considered vital to an
assessment of the Ba'th. This section will focus on the
economic and social policies of the Ba'th Party since 1968.
'
03Edmund Ghareeb, "Iraq in the Gulf," in Iraa in Transition,
ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986), 65.
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1. Econonic Policies
Article One of the Iraqi Constitution states that
the aim of the government is to "establish a Socialist
System." 2 4 It goes further to state that the "State shall
undertake planning, directing and guiding the national
economy" and the "National resources and fundamental
instruments of production are the property of the people." 2"'
Right from the very start the Ba'th Party took complete
control over the economic destiny of the country.
The method for their dominance was laid out in a six
step plan.2"6 The plan called for: planning and research,
agrarian reform, nationalization of the oil industry,
industrialization, irrigation, and for social and cultural
development. The emphasis on economic aspects of this plan
are plain. Five of the six are aspects of what the Ba'th
has pursued since 1968. Along with these factors of
economic development, the dramatic growth of government and
the changes in policy direction have also been notable.
The Ba'th government quickly set out to plan for the
future. It modeled its planning systems from those in the
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five year plans, with budgets in the hundreds of millions,
to achieve economic goals became the norm. Central Planning
boards began to plan everything from what will be produced
to how much. The planning boards initially followed the
development program set out by the earlier Aref regime and
the first five year plan was not ready until 1971.2"'
Subsequent five year plans were used to spur development in
the industries considered critical to the Ba'thist regime:
oil, steel, building materials, and transportation.'°
Setbacks in the central planning of the Ba'th government
have occurred during the war with Iran when the fourth five
year plan, 1981-1985, was suspended and the fifth, 1986-
1990, was never implemented.2 0 •
The second as well as the fifth phase of the six
step plan was for the reform of agriculture. Iraq has gone
from a food self-sufficient country in the 1950s to a
country that has imported up to 25 percent of its needs in
the late 1970s.Q11 Reform started when the monarchy was
2 0 1Ibid., 113.
2 
"Jonathan Crusoe, "Economic Outlook: Guns and Butter, Phase
Two?" in Iraq in Transition, ed. Frederick W. Axelgard (Boulder:
Westview Press, 1986), 39.
2 0 9Iraq: A Country Study, 127.
2 1
°Kieth McLachlan, "Iraq: Problems of Regional Development,"
in The InteQration of Modern Iraq, ed. Abbas Kelidar (New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1979), 145.
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toppled in 1958 but brought to new levels with the Ba'th in
charge. While land redistribution has been a key element in
the Qasim and Ba'thist regimes, it has not been that
effective. More than three years after the Ba'th Party took
over, less than 20 percent of the landholders still owned
more than 66 percent of the land. 211 The government has also
endeavored to increase the amount of land that is viable for
farming. Massive irrigation projects including dams have
been completed in an attempt to reduce the amount of land
lost due to increasing salinity in the soil with limited
success.212
The government also began to spend money on
agriculture like it had never been done before. 21 3 The state
began to provide seeds, fertilizers, water, and the tools
for the producers. 2 14 Cooperatives, collectives, and state
farms were set up to try to increase the output and to
provide more people with the opportunity to work, a
mandatory objective according to the socialist principles of
the Ba'th. By 1975 there were 1,653 cooperatives, 72
2 11Sluglett and Sluglett, 139.
"
2 12McLachlan, 146, 147. Iraq: A Country Study, 154.
213Marr, The Modern History of Irag, 249. While she notes
that the percentage of developmental funds has actually declined
from the 1950s its real dollar amounts have gone up dramatically
because of much higher budgets.
214Khadduri, 119.
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collective farms, and nine state owned farms throughout
Iraq.21" However, for all its planning and spending on
agricultural reform, the plans have not stopped the rural to
urban migration of the population. No less than 50 percent
of Iraq's population was involved in agricultural production
during the 1950s, and by 1977 that figure had dropped to
less than 30 percent with a corresponding shift in the rural
and urban populations."16 This area of the six step plan has
clearly not gone according to Ba'thist desires, but with the
ability to import food the regime has been able to minimize
its effects.
Nothing in the Ba'thist program has been more
successful than the plan to nationalize the oil industry.
In May 1972 the Ba'th government nationalized the northern
oilfields of the Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC). 21 7 Since the
discovery of oil in Iraq the government had only been
receiving royalties from the foreign owners, mainly British.
The revenues collected by the Iraqi government rose
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Ba'th," 201.
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1968 to US $26 billion in 1980.21' The nationalization came
just before the oil price rises of the 1970s and the
Ba'thist government benefited greatly. Oil became the
primary source of income for the government with a rise from
under 20 percent of net government income from oil in 1968
to over 50 percent in 1980.219 The use of oil revenues to
fund all aspects of the economic program was evident. Oil
nationalization was the tool that the Ba'th hoped would
bring the country out of the "third world syndrome. n°21
Industrialization, the fourth step of the plan, has
been a top priority of the Ba'th. With the government
controlling and planning the entire process it was clear
from the start that this area would receive the majority of
the available funding, over 30 percent of the development
budget prior to the war with Iran."' By building up of
heavy industries such as steel, iron, and building
materials, the Ba'th is trying to become an economic
powerhouse in the region. The government has long desired
the role of being an exporter of goods other than oil from
Iraq. Expansions in the fields of cement production,
"
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vegetable oils, and fertilizers were all marked for the
export market."22
The emphasis on socialist economic development in
Ba'thist Iraq has also made the government by far the
largest employer and further entrenches the Ba'thist rule.
The government payroll increased from 224,253 employees in
1968 to over 935,000 non-military employees in 1980.223 The
party has made every attempt to create a loyal and obedient
workforce that owes their jobs to the patronage of the Ba'th
Party. The spending on development has created a monstrous
bureaucracy where there is approximately one government
employee for every 15 members of the population not counting
the internal security or armed forces."24
Ba'thist economic policies have been funded for the
most part by revenues from the export of oil. After the war
with Iran started in 1980 these revenues came crashing down.
The pre-war income generated by Iraqi crude was about US $21
billion in 1979 and it was running at US $26 billion in
1980,"25 however, after the war started, the income was
2 2 Khadduri, 132.
2 23al-Khalil, 41.
22
'This figure is based on the population estimates for Iraq
in 1980 of nearly 12 million.
12 'Freedman and Karsh, 19.
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estimated at just over US $10 billion for 1982.'2b The loss
of income was staggering.
The government tried to continue economic
development spending patterns as before, but could not
sustain both a guns and butter policy. The 1981 non-war
expenditures were US $23.6 billion, an all time high, but
with exports dropping off by more than 60 percent it was
clear that austerity measures would have to be implemented
sooner or later.227 The development budget, which had been
running at over 30 percent of the national budget, was cut
to below 18 percent and shifted its emphasis to war related
materials and alternative export routes for oil. 228
In addition to cutting the amount of money spent on
economic development the government turned to a more liberal
policy regarding private enterprise. In the last two years
of the war, the Ba'th government sought to make the economy
vigorous by lifting price controls, attempting to attract
foreign capital, and by privatizing many of the state owned
businesses.2 29 Saddam Hussein at one point said, "From now
226Irag: A Country Study, 261. Production and revenue
figures for the war years are published here.
2 71Ibid., 123.
22 8Marr, 301.
229Freedman and Karsh, 22.
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on the state should not embark on uneconomic activity, "230
and shortly thereafter the government proceeded to privatize
95 percent of the gas stations, most state run agricultural
enterprises, most state department stores, and even some
state operated industries, notably Iraqi Airways. 231
The government cut back on the numbers of foreign
workers that would be allowed into Iraq, a number that had
swelled due to the shortage of manpower because of the war.
It also changed its labor laws to allow for the reduction in
the size of workforces and the elimination of lifetime
employment. 232 By the end of the war the Ba'thist government
was deeply in debt to foreign creditors and its ability to
meet the payments was only accomplished by taking the money
out of economic and social program budgets. The war caused
major disruptior3 in the economic policies of the Ba'thist
government and the situation has not improved due to the war
in Kuwait and the ongoing United Nations sanctions that
prohibit all but the most needed imports.
2. Social Policies
Social policies are an area where the Ba'thist
government has made significant progress during its tenure
23 0 1rag: A Country Study, 129.
2 31Ibid., 130.
232Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 188.
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in Iraq. Article two of the Constitution proclaims that
"the people is the source of authority and its (Iraq's]
legitimacy.""2' The party has put forth it programs in an
attempt to accomplish the sixth step, the social and
cultural development of a secular society, in its plan for
Iraq. 234 The Ba'thist government has sought to achieve this
goal through egalitarian measures, education and health
improvements, and through the promulgation of a Ba'thist
view of history. And where these measures have failed to
co-opt the people they have resorted to coercive means.
Part three of the Constitution directly addresses
the egalitarian question for the Balth. 235  The words
equality, dignity, privacy, freedom, and innocence are used
throughout. The Ba'th government has gone through a great
deal of effort to ensure that some of these words have
meaning. The goal of equality has been carried out with the
attempt to eliminate the middle and upper classes of
landowners, the liberation of women in a Muslim society,' 36
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average workers life.2 3' The Ba'th has even gone as far as
to pass laws concerning the rights of women in society and
to sponsor womens organizations. During their tenure the
number of Iraqi women in the workforce has increased
dramatically.2
The education and literacy policies that the Ba'th
government have undertaken have produced significant
improvements in both of these areas in Iraq. The Ba'th
government has seen to it that schooling is free for all
levels of education through university and that it is
mandatory through the secondary level. Phebe Marr reports in
her book The Modern History of Iraq, that between the years
1968 and 1983 the number of children attending school has
gone from 1,265,000 in 1968 to 3,720,000 in 1983.239 Even
more recent statistics show that number to have increased
again to 4,132,820 students in 1985.24" In addition to
increasing the number of students and schools throughout
Iraq, the Ba'th government also began a very intensive
237Khadduri, 138. The labor laws of 1970 and 1971 gave
workers rights in the workplace, unionizing authority, and set up
a pension program similar to the US Social Security program. All
but the labor union aspects remain in force.
238al-khalil, 88 89.
239Marr, The Modern History of IraQ, 241.
24 0IraQ: A Country Study, 260. Comprehensive statistics on
all levels of schooling as well as numbers of schools may be
found here.
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"anti-illiteracy" program in 1978. It was designed to help,
and even force, older Iraqi citizens to learn to read
through completion of a two year course of instruction aimed
at all adults.24' The literacy rate has recently surpassed
60 percent for those over the age of 15, both male and
female, bringing Iraq up from the bottom of the world
rankings up to the middle.242
In the area of health reform the Ba'th has fostered
the growth and capability of the healthcare system during
the last 25 years. Healthcare is free and the number of
hospital beds has increased from 9200 in 1958 to over 24,700
in 1982, while the number of doctors has increased from 1190
to 4661 and the number of dentists has increased from 112 to
897 during the same period. 243 Even more impressive is the
rise in the ratio of doctors to population. It has gone
from one doctor for every 4,200 in 1968 to one doctor for
every 1,790 in 1980.244 This policy has significantly helped
the population with respect to life expectancy, 46 years in
1960 to 67 years in 1980, and infant mortality, 139 per 1000
241Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 201.
242Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, 162.
243Marr, The Modern History of IraQ, 263.
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live births in 1960 to 66 per 1000 live births in 1991.24"
It should also be remembered that this was done during a
time when Iraq was in an all out war that may have claimed
well over 100,000 Iraqi lives.2 46
The Ba'th government has also gone about a
systematic program of re-writing history to emphasize the
distinctively Iraqi nature of it. The archeological program
within Iraq has received a great deal of attention, as well
as money, from the Ba'th government. The budget for the
Administration of Antiquities shot up by more than 81
percent after the Ba'th Party took over. 2" Government
sponsorship of extensive restoration projects at Hatra,
Nineveh, Nimrod, Ashur, and most noteably, Babylon were
started and continued to be funded even during the war with
Iran while other more economically viable projects
suffered.2" Another project the Ba'th moved forward in was
the renaming of eight provinces to reflect an Arab past and
to directly refute any possible Persian connection.249 The
24
.Ibid., 264, and The World Factbook, 162.
"
246Iraq: A Country Study, 245.
24 7Baram, 41.
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24 91bid., 61, 62. The name changes were: al-Ramadi to al-
Anbar, Kut to Wasit, Diwaniyya to Qadisyya, Nasiriyya to Dhiqar,
Al-Amara to Maysan, Mosel to Nineveh, and Al-Hilla to Babylon.
One new province was created in the Tikrit area, that of Salah
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re-writing of history was complete with the altering of
money and stamps to reflect the past as well as the
association of Saddam Hussein with the great "Iraqi" leaders
of history."
The government has sought every way possible to
socialize the people into their Ba'thist mindset, including
the massive influx of money to attempt to bring the Shi'a
population economically up to the rest of the country, 251 but
when that has failed they have fallen back on the internal
security forces to force their position on the opposition.
Al-Khalil reports that more than 200,000 Iraqis have been
deported from Iraq for not falling in line with the Ba'th
government and that around 350,000 Kurds have been resettled
away from their homes because of opposition to the
government. 2  Reports of the use of torture and brutality
are widespread. The government has been accused of using
chemical weapons on its own population to quell dissent and
that brutality against single families, women and children
al-Din.
25
"Reid, 82, and Baram, 60, 97.
251Dawisha, 23. The government spent large amounts of money
both before and after the war with Iran to improve Shila living
conditions, religious sites, and job potential.
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are regular occurances. The Ba'th, as policy, have not
tolerated dissent or opposition in the past and they have
had the means to either oppress it or to wipe it out
entirely.
D. LEGITIMACY
The goal of the Ba'th Party since its coming to power in
1968 has been to be the legitimate government representing
the people of Iraq. They have even made the claim "that
they derived their mandate to govern the country from the
people" and that their rule would eventually be legitimized
by popular expression through democratic processes." 254 This
is something they can claim to be true with the elections of
1980, 1984, and 1989. Since its attainment of power, the
legitimacy of the Ba'th government has rested on the
leadership of the party, the institutionalization that it
has brought to Iraq, the policies that it has carried out,
and through the adaptation of the traditional Ba'thist
ideology to the particular situation in Iraq.
From the very beginning the leadership of the Ba'th
Party has sought to win the support of the population for
their rule. One of the primary reasons of the rise to
power of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr was that he was seen by the
2
.




people as a man with impeccable nationalist credentials and
that he "brought the party a certain legitimacy."255 Being
ten years older than the rest of the new leadership also
gave him the mantle of being the patriarch of Iraq. The
leadership of al-Bakr lasted for a decade in which the Iraqi
people saw great improvement in their lives and much of this
improvement has been attributed to al-Bakr and his
successor, Saddam Hussein.
When Saddam Hussein took over in 1979,Iraq was a country
that was realizing the potential of its vast oil reserves.
It has been pointed out that "Saddam has ... personified his
country since taking over as president in 1979."2"6 His
leadership has been glorified in every way possible. His
picture adorns nearly every building, office, and there are
even art exhibitions dedicated to his likeness. During his
tenure, Saddam Hussein has tried to assume the "mantle of
pan-Arabism from Nasser" and the claim to affiliation with
the likes of Nebuchadnezzar and the family of the prophet
Muhammad.257 Saddam Hussein has brought legitimacy to the
Ba'thist hold on the leadership position in Iraq by default.






The legitimacy the Balth has gained through the
institutionalization of the party throughout Iraq has been
because of the penetration the party has been able to
achieve. The growth of the party and its ability to control
society down to the neighborhood level has caused the
population to choose between the Ba'th and obscurity. The
Ba'th government has made attempts to integrate other
"progressive" parties into the governing structure through
the National Action Charter and National Progressive
Front. 2  The Ba'thist opening of political debate, however
muted because of Ba'thist control, has been seen to add to
the legitimacy of their rule.
The bureaucratic and civil institutionalization of the
party have added legitimacy by the sheer numbers of people
that owe their assistance to the patronage of the Ba'th.
The size of government has grown tremendously during the
Ba'thist tenure and its penetration into labor unions and
popular organizations of every kind has been complete.
Party control over virtually every part of the public and
private sector is to be understood as building the necessary




It is the institutionalization of the military that the
Ba'th can attribute much of the their longevity to. The
initial and subsequent purges of the military hierarchy have
allowed the Ba'th to keep loyal members in the leadership
positions of the armed forces. Party doctrine calls for
military leadership to "be party members first and military
specialists second." 260 With the spread of Ba'th members in
the military, the legitimacy that the government attains is
bound to go up. Under Ba'thist control the military has
grown from a barely survivable defense force to the largest
force in the Middle East. 26' There is no question as to
whether the military is an extension of the Ba'th. The
internal oppression that the military has willingly
inflicted on both the Kurds in the North and the Shi'as in
the South is a testimony that the military provides the
Ba'th leadnrship legitimacy by force, if not by numbers of
troops.
It is the policies of the Ba'th over the last 25 years
that have brought about the most popular legitimacy of the
government. Under Ba'thist rule the population of Iraq has
measurably improved its standard of living in both the
26 0Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 189.
261Iraq: A Country Study, 263. It has well over a million
members including the reserve forces.
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economic and social areas. The economic policies followed
have produced thousands of jobs and raised the per capita
income from about US $47 in 1958-1959262 to US $1,940 in 1990
with a real growth rate estimate of ten percent.26 3 While
much of this increase can be attributed to the increase in
the price of oil, it must be remembered that the Ba'th Party
led the way to oil nationalization and thus can claim
responsibility for the successes of the country.
In the area of social policy the Ba'th government has
endeavored to touch every Iraqi with widespread programs for
the improvement of life. They have overseen the increase in
life expectancy, the decrease in infant mortality, and the
institution of universal free health services for the entire
population.2"4 The government's progress on educating the
young and illiterate has been equally as impressive. Their
policies on women's rights have allowed women an unparalled
place in Middle Eastern society. Al-Khalil reports that as
of 1980, women constituted 46 percent of all teachers, 29
percent of all doctors, 46 percent of all dentists, 70
percent of pharmacists, and about 15 to 20 percent of the
262Marr, The Modern History of Iraq, 269.
26 3Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992, 162.
264Marr, 241, 263, 264.
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entire workforce. 26" If social welfare and economic
wellbeing are an indication of legitimacy, the Ba'th has
achieved impressive gains through their programs while they
have been in charge.
The cultural programs that the Ba'th Party has followed
have also attributed to the legitimacy of the party. The
Ba'th has consistently strived to create a uniquely "Iraqi"
sense of being. Through the use of history the Ba'th has
been able to blur the lines of whether or not the historical
greatness of Iraq was Arab or not by claiming that all the
"great civilizations" came from Iraq.2tb Saddam Hussein has
encouraged and even required, schools and museums to work
together to educate Iraqi children on the "Iraqi unique"
history of the regior. It is through these efforts that he
has hoped to create a type of "melting pot" in Iraq that
would encompass the Kurds and Arabs. 2"' The government has
even used stamps, coins, and the excavation of historical
sites to manipulate history and help legitimize their rule.
The use of ideology by the Ba'th has been the
cornerstone of the regimes claim to legitimacy.26" The party
26 5al-Khalil, 88.
26 6Baram, 97.
26 71bid., 34, 35, 38, 44.
268Marr, "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the
Ba'th," 206.
99
ideology of "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" has allowed the
Ba'th government to shape society into what they want. It
is the central theme of the Constitution and has been in the
rhetoric, if not the meaning, of all party pronouncements
since the Ba'th came to power in 1968.
As has been discussed before the three main ideological
standards that the Ba'th have proclaimed are Unity, Freedom,
and Socialism. The first term, "Unity", has traditionally
meant the unity of the Arab people throughout the Middle
East. The Ba'th Party in Iraq has proclaimed this, but in
practice it has focused its attention on the unity of Iraq.
Amatzia Baram has pointed out that Saddam Hussein has even
stated publicly in a lecture to educational committees
engaged in rewriting Iraqi school textbooks that the "Arab
homeland ... is still an unfulfilled goal", and "that we
must not submerge ourselves in the theoretical pan-Arab and
neglect the direct local patriotic."2 6 9 The Ba'th Party has
spent considerable time and effort in trying to unify the
people of Iraq. The phrase "Ba'thism in one country" became
a rallying cry and the idea that "Ba'thism would become
synonymous with Iraq, its bastion, and then spread to the
rest of the Arab world under Iraq's leadership."27 °
269Baram, 20, quoted in Saddam Hussein, al-Thawra wal-nazra
al-jadida (Baghdad, 1981), 79, 80.
27 0Marr, 207.
100
The second term in the Iraqi Ba'thist ideology,
"Freedom", has traditionally meant the freedom from
imperialism and the right to choose the country's own
destiny. Under the Ba'thist Constitution, the individual
will have rights "without distinction on the basis of race,
origin, language, class or religion."27 ' In practice the
Ba'th has violated every one of these guarantees without
exception. The Kurds have been persecuted, the Iraqi
citizens of Iranian origin have been persecuted and
deported, the former landowning class has been stripped of
its positions without compensation, and the Jews have been
forced to flee from the very first days of the Ba'thist
rule. The only sure freedom in the country has been for the
ruling elite to make the rules and enforce them without
regard for anything except remaining in power.
The third term, "Socialism", has traditionally meant
that the government will own and operate the means of
production. The Constitution addresses this area in the
very first article by declaring the desire to "establish a
Socialist System." 21 2 The Ba'th government has been
successful in implementing such a system. With the
exception of the economic reforms caused by the war with
2 7 1Khadduri, 186. Articles 19 through 36 define the rights
and responsibilities of the citizens and the State.
272Khadduri, 183.
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Iran, the government has owned and operated virtually all of
the medium to large industry within the country.
The Ba'th Party has also gone after the meshing of its
secular nationalism with the religious nature of some parts
of Iraqi society. While rejecting the participation of the
Islamic clergy in politics, the party has tried to use them
to further their goals. The Balth has claimed that "Islam
was essentially an Arab movement, of which the prime
importance was the renewal and fulfillment of Arabism." 2"3
The secular Ba'thist government used Islam during the war
with Iran on various occasions to try to further their
cause, such as when Saddam Hussein claimed decendency from
the Prophet Muhammad. More recently the words "Allahu
Akbar" (God is Great) were added to the national flag in
January 1991 during the Persian Gulf crisis as a religious
call to arms against the coalition forces aligned against
Iraq.
The legitimacy that the Ba'th Party has gained during
its more than 25 years in power has been manifested in the
way it has governed. The Iraqi Ba'th Party has provided
sustained leadership with Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam
Hussein. This is a stability that Iraq had not seen in its
modern era. The party has created and maintained the solid
27 3Devlin, 24. While this reflect the thinking of Michel
Aflaq, the Iraqi Ba'th has adopted it.
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institutionalization that is needed to remain in power in a
diverse country like Iraq. Its policies have provided the
means for people to better their lives as long as they stay
within the bounds of the Ba'thist desires. And finally the
Ba'th has uniquely tailored its traditional ideology to fit
the changing situations in Iraq, and it has allowed them to
adapt to almost any setback. What Phebe Marr ended her 1988
essay "Iraq: Its Revolutionary Experience Under the Ba'th,"
is still true in the 1990s. "Iraq ... is a very different




The Ba'th Party has ruled Iraq for over 25 years and
there are no signs that it is about to relinquish its hold
on that rule. This thesis has attempted to describe the
birth, growth, and entrenchment of the Ba'th against the
political history of Iraq. From its colonial beginnings
Iraq evolved into first a monarchy, then an autocracy, and
eventually what many would describe as a totalitarian state
controlled by the Ba'th Party and Saddam Hussein.
The Ba'th Party's humble beginnings in 1940 spread over
the next 12 years into Jordan, Lebanon, and eventually in
1952, to Iraq. What started with just three school teachers
and a couple of small groups of students in the early years
became a political movement that would contend for power by
the mid-1950s. The structure of the Ba'th was made simple
and adaptable. Even after its "customization" in Iraq, the
structure of the party remained highly disciplined and
manageable for the leadership.
Ideology has remained constant in rhetoric, if not
practiced, throughout the Iraqi Ba'thist tenure. The
platform of "Unity, Freedom, Socialism" remains as strong
today as it was when Michel Aflaq spelled it out in the 1947
Constitution. The changes in ideology have come from the
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leadership in Iraq in response to the perceived needs of the
day, such as the war with Iran or the war over Kuwait.
There have been four principle leaders of the Iraqi
Ba'th Party. It is these men, with their mostly homogeneous
following, who have defined the path that the Ba'th has
taken since its migration to Iraq. Fu'ad al-Rikabi did not
found the Iraqi branch of the party but he gave it vitality,
and a good portion of the membership through his relatives,
and led it down the road to prominence. When the Ba'th
gained power in 1963 it was led by Ali Salih al-Sa'di.
During his reign the Ba'th was known for its terror tactics
and its ruthless treatment of opposition forces. It is
during al-Sa'di's tenure as leader that the Iraqi Ba'th was
almost destroyed after its fall from power in November 1963.
It was resurrected by the two leaders that followed him,
Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein.
When Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr took the reigns of power in
1965 the Ba'th was a party in hiding and was not close to
being able to challenge the Aref regime's hold on power.
Al-Bakr led the party back and in 1968 the Ba'th was able to
form a coalition with opposition army leaders, whom it would
oust from the coalition just two weeks after the coup, and
come to power once again. This was the start of the most
enduring leadership that the Ba'th Party, as well as Iraq,
has seen since the time of the mandate. The smooth shift of
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power between al-Bakr and Saddam Hussein in 1979 has seen a
continuation of the Ba'th's leadership of Iraq. The
defining nature of the leadership position has been brought
to new levels with Saddam Hussein as President. The Ba'th
is today merely a reflection of Saddam Hussein. He has
personalized it and made the successes of the party his own,
and the failures the responsibility of forces opposing the
party.
The Ba'th has sought to institutionalize its position in
society. Through the use of political, bureaucratic, civil,
and military structures and infiltration the party has had a
great deal of control at every level of society from the
largest corporation to the smallest village. Ba'thist
control over society has made society dependent on the Ba'th
for its livelihood as well as its subsistence. The Ba'th
has created a "Patron-Client" relationship on a national
scale for a good part of the Iraqi population. The Ba'th
has become in reality, the "Big Brother" made famous by
Orwell in his novel, 1984.
Ba'thist economic and social policies have lrd to vast
improvements in almost all sectors of living standards in
Iraq. The implementation of the egalitarian socialist
economic system has been the key to Ba'thist economic
policy. With the exception of its agricultural policies,
the Ba'th, helped by the nationalization and price rises in
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oil, has been able to provide jobs, growth, and stability in
what was once a primarily agricultural economy. It is the
two Gulf wars and their massive costs in both manpower and
money that have put the only dampers on the economy in Iraq.
In the social sector, the Ba'th has made progress in
education, health, and the cultural fields. Education is
universally free for all citizens through the university
level. Access to healthcare facilities has been upgraded
significantly and is free for citizens. The effort to
educate the public on its "uniquely Iraqi" history has been
significant.
The Ba'th has spent considerable national resources in
socializing its message, but when it has not worked, the
party has relied on more forceful methods to ensure its
retention of power. Whether it is the use of the internal
security forces to suppress opposition groups or the mass
deportations of citizens who have some tie to Iran, the
Ba'th have done whatever it takes. It is clear that the
Ba'th has not and will not tolerate any disagreement with
its policies.
The Ba'thist record since it came to power in 1968 has
given it the right to claim to be the legitimate
representative of the people. The party has claimed that
the people would grant it legitimacy through popular
democratic processes. The government has held elections for
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a National Assembly, but whether or not they can be called
democratic, with total Ba'thist control of the process, is a
debatable question. The efforts of the Ba'th Party to
legitimatize their rule through leadership,
institutionalization, and policy implementation have brought
stability to Iraq, and improved the standard of living of
the citizens.
A. THE AFTERMATH OF THE GULF WAR AND THE FUTURE
It is the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1990-1991 and the
concurrent speculation about the future of the Ba'thist
leadership in Iraq that have been foremost on the minds of
those studying Iraq since the Kuwaiti crisis. The Gulf War
saw the formation of the largest coalition of forces since
World War Two, 28 countries including many Arab countries."'
All of them were aligned against Iraq after it invaded,
occupied, and eventually annexed Kuwait. After a little
more than six months of bluster on the part of Iraq and
preparation on the part of the coalition, Iraqi forces were
soundly defeated and driven from Kuwait. The aftermath of
this conflict, however, is still taking its toll on Iraq.
The Ba'thist government has had to suffer through the
imposition of further restrictions on its ability to govern
2 7 5
"Desert Storm:Coalition Commitment to Desert Storm; The
Coalition," Defense 91, Sep-Oct 1991, 58-59.
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and it has had to attempt to bring the population back from
the defeat while remaining in power.
1. The Aftermath of the War
From the very first United Nations Security Council
Resolution (SCR) condemning the invasion of Kuwait, SCR 660,
and the resolution imposing sanctions, SCR 661, the world
has set about systematically trying to punish Iraq and its
Ba'thist leadership for their attack against Kuwait. 27 6 The
resolutions continued even after the war was over with the
passage of SCR 687, which continued the economic blockade
and embargo until the Iraqi government satisfactorily meets
the demands of the coalition leaders.27' These conditions
are often thought to include the removal of Saddam Hussein
from the government.
The aftermath of the war has also seen the uprisings
of both the Kurds in the North and the Shi'as in the
South. 278 The Ba'thist government has responded by using the
276
"The U.N. Resolutions: The Complete Text," in The Gulf War
Reader, ed. Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf (New York: Times
Books, 1991), 137, 138. Resolutions 660 through 678 may be found
here.
277Ahmed S. Hashim, "Threat or threatened: Security in Iraq
and Impact on Its Neighbors," in Balance of Power in Central and
Southwest Asia, ed. Steven R. Dorr and Neysa M. Slater
(Washington D.C.: Defense Academic Research Support Program,
1992), 14.
278Ibid., 14-20. the author provides a detailed account of
the uprisings and the reasons for their failure.
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forces that remained after the fighting with the coalition
to put down the rebellions. The United Nations sponsored
"Safe Havens", SCR 688, in response to the devastation that
Saddam Hussein's forces were inflicting on the Kurds. 279 The
Ba'thist government was further hampered by "Operation
Provide Comfort""2 ' in which direct outside humanitarian
support was given to the Kurds in northern Iraq. The
government has had to accept these restraints, as well as
the implementation of "No Fly" zones for Iraqi aircraft in
both the North, above the 36th parallel, and South, below
the 32nd parallel, the continuing inspections for weapons of
mass destruction, and the occasional attack against
facilities or military sites by the coalition forces."'
The economic devastation in Iraq after the war with
the coalition has been nearly complete. The economy has
virtually ground to a halt. Reports of nearly all
industries working at reduced capacity or on the verge of
stopping altogether have become commonplace. 2"2 The areas of
27 9Freedman and Karsh, 421.
280Ibid.
281
"A Missile To Many," The Economist, 23-29 January 1993,
37. These attacks have included shooting down Iraqi warplanes,
bombing anti-aircraft sites, and Tomahawk missile attacks on
buildings suspected as being sites used for the manufacture or
design of nuclear weapons.
282Hashim, 20.
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electrical generation and distribution, the oil industry,
and telecommunications and transportation have been
particularly hit hard. 28 3 But even with these setbacks the
Ba'thist government is attempting to restore some services
and to rebuild what it can. Reports in the summer of 1991
had significant restoration work being done to the majority
of basic service industries throughout Iraq.2"4 Christine
Helms goes so far as to say that "electricity was returned
to 68 percent of its former capacity by October 1991 without
... the assistance of the US Army Corps of Engineers.""28'
The population of Iraq is clearly suffering from the
sanctions imposed on it by the United Nations. But the
continued rule of the Ba'thist leadership of Saddam Hussein
has brought a certain amount restoration of life to the
country. The more the Ba'thist regime is able to
accomplish, the more likely the people will tolerate the
type of rule they have endured for the last 25 years.
2. The Future
Many knowledgeable people continue to claim that
once Saddam Hussein has been ousted that Iraq, as well as
the rest of the Middle East, will return to some version of




"peace, security, and predictability."28 These claims have
gone on since early 1991 and cannot be proven to be true
given that Saddam Hussein has not been removed from power
and it appears that he is not likely to leave power any time
soon. A variety of leadership choices for Iraq has been
examined and written about. But, the fact remains that the
Ba'th Party is still in control and is heavily entrenched in
Iraq.
While the coalition forces continue to "punish"
Iraq, the Ba'thist government has been trying to rebuild and
provide the leadership needed to emerge from this state of
affairs. The regime has cracked down on opposition groups
and further consolidated its position by purging members of
the party, the military, and the bureaucracy who may be
suspect of having their own personal agenda and not that of
the government.2 87 Saddam Hussein has increased the roles
played by family members and fellow TiKritis in the
government and military in an attempt to ensure their
loyalty at the highest levels."' The regime has also
narrowed the party membership to include only those who are





ensure loyalty."89 The Ba'th has been able to use the
coalition attacks to bolster its position by claiming that
the attacks are against the "people" of Iraq and thus
shifting blame from the policies of the government to that
of the coalition.29
The prospects for the demise of Saddam Hussein grow
with every passing day, after all he is getting older, he
turned 56 this year, and eventually he will die. The
prospects for change, even with Saddam Hussein gone, in the
near future are much less certain. The 25 years of
leadership that the Ba'th Party has brought to Iraq has
changed Iraqi society. The political, social, bureaucratic,
and military institutions of Iraq are different now than
when the Ba'th took over in 1968. The Ba'th Party can claim
a certain amount of "pluralism by emphasizing the civilian
nature of the party, aiming recruitment at the young, and
stressing 'Iraqi identity' as opposed to disparate,
conflicting communal affiliations"2 91 as was done previously.
The Ba'th regime has done much to improve the
standard of living in Iraq over the last 25 years and that
progress will not be forgotten overnight. If the Ba'thist
1191bid.
290
"A Short, Not Very Sharp, Punch," The Economist, 16-22
January 1993, 41.
2 9 1Helms, 42.
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regime can restore some of the pre-war prosperity to the
population, its power will be assured. The setbacks as a
result of the war with the coalition forces have
dramatically hurt and threatened the Ba'thist government in
Baghdad, but that government has survived. The sanctions
and embargo against Iraq are under more pressure daily to be
lifted 292 or moderated and will not last forever. The United
States cannot afford to impose the "No Fly" Zones in Iraq
indefinitely and those too will not last forever. Iraq
still has the vast oil resources that helped to bring about
a better life, and with the world's supplies becoming ever
more scarce while demand continues to rise, eventually, Iraq
will be allowed to sell again.29 3
Just as people have been saying that Saddam Hussein
is the root of all evils in Iraq, they go on to try to
predict the successor regimes. Some notable choices have
been the military, a resurgent Ba'th Party without Saddam
Hussein, the Shi'as, the Kurds, the Communists, and the
292
"A Missile Too Many," The Economist, 23-29 January 1993,
38. The other countries of the Middle East, including turkey,
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Egypt have been calling for restraint
with regard to punishment for Iraq because of its destabilizing
nature of both Iraq and the region and the failure of the West to
impose measures like this against non-Middle Eastern countries,
such as Serbia and Israel.
293Helms, 45. She notes that there have been reports that
Iraq has arranged to sell oil to both Turkey and Jordan as well
as other trade with Iran as of September 1992.
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coalition of external opposition groups.29 ' All of these
groups have only one thing in common. They are assumed to
not include Saddam Hussein and his tight band of Tikriti
followers. The groups are generally made up of diverse
opinions and they appear to have largely opposite views of
the future of Iraq. There is widespread fear that should
the Ba'th Party fall from power that Iraq would end up worse
off than it is under the Ba'th. 2"
None of the predictions assumes that the resulting
leadership may not call itself by the same name, but that it
may act in entirely the same ways and be staffed with the
same people. The present bureaucracy, military, and just
about every other "middle-class" survivor in Iraq owes some
of the wealth and status they have to the Ba'th regime and
Saddam Hussein. If that regime should fall, there is great
fear that the ensuing "bloodbath" of the oppressed classes
will engulf them as well. 296 It is to their benefit to see
that the current regime, or one that will ensure their place
294Graham E. Fuller, Irag in the Next Decade: Will Iraq
Survive Until 2002? RAND Note N-3591-DAG (Santa Monica: RAND,
1993), 30-47. Both the Christine Helms and Ahmed Hashim articles
point to similar conclusions about the future leadership.
29
"Helms, 43.
296Hashim, 22. It should be noted that with most of the
previous changes in government in Iraq the well-to-do and those
associated with the government have been subject to brutality and
torture at the hands of the new governments.
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in society, be in power in Baghdad. Should such a
leadership emerge it would have plenty of examples to
follow. The world has been faced with this scenario since
the end of the Cold War with many of the former Communist
regimes of Eastern Europe. If it worked for those regimes,
there is no reason to believe that it would not wozk for the
forces that control Iraq.
The Ba'th Party has worked very hard for the last 25
years to instill its version of government on the people of
Iraq. The successes: economic prosperity, education,
health, and a generally better life have not been lost on
the population. The current setbacks due to the war with
the coalition are dramatic, but not insurmountable. The
Ba'th Party is firmly in control of most of the country,
with the exception of some of the Kurdish areas, and the
opposition has not been strong enough or organized enough to
command any kind of mass response of the people. Should the
Ba'thist government of Saddam Hussein fall, it is likely
that someone with views very similar will take over. There
are far too many people with far too much to lose for any
other sort of government to emerge in the short term.
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